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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, economic theory justified public provision of goods and services in case of market failure. 
To account for monopoly power, externalities and other market failures, this has led to the nationalisa-
tion of private firms, such as in the sectors of insurance, mining and telecommunications. However, 
since the early 1980s, the large budget deficits in many OECD countries and the fall of Communism 
have led to an end of this paradigm. Public production is increasingly privatised, and a theory of gov-
ernment failures has subsequently begun to develop. According to this theory, the conditions under 
which state provision is superior to private provision are highly limited (Schleifer 1998). It is in this con-
text that governments increasingly attempted to transfer methods of private business management to 
the public sector and started to outsource public services through competitive tenders to the private 
sector (Sørensen 2014). Since the late 1990s, this privatisation effort also led to a growing tendency to 
outsource public employment services for job seekers (Finn 2011). In this study, our key objectives are 
to discover whether (i) outsourcing of these services to the private sector enhances performance rela-
tive to in-house public provision, and (ii) whether private non-profit organisations (NPOs) are more effi-
cient in this delivery than private for-profit organisations (FPOs). 
Contractual incompleteness procures a strong case for privatisation. If not all contingencies with regards 
the provision of a good or a service can be stipulated in a contract, the costs and benefits of these 
contingencies accrue to the residual claimant (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990). In case 
of contracting out to an FPO, contractual incompleteness provides strong incentives to invest in cost 
reductions. By contrast, a public manager receives no returns to these investments; hence, the stimulus 
for such efficiency enhancing activities is considerably weaker. However, if quality is difficult to measure, 
or renegotiation is not possible, e.g., if rewards are ex ante fixed in performance contracts, these incen-
tives may induce private overinvestment in cost saving technologies, leading to sub-standard quality 
(Hart, Schleifer and Vishny 1997). Nevertheless, even then public in-house production need not out-
perform private provision (Schleifer 1998). First, if consumers are capable to assess quality, then com-
petition between private providers could restore efficiency. Second, in case that goods and services are 
to be delivered repeatedly, and quality can be evaluated over a longer-term period, then reputation 
building with the aim of attracting future contracts may be sufficient to curb these adverse incentives. 
Third, in case of the provision of pro-social services, there may be NPOs in the market with an “intrinsic” 
motivation or a “mission” to deliver high quality (e.g., Besley and Ghatak 2005; Gregg, Grout, Ratcliffe, 
Smith and Windmeijer 2011). The presence of a profit motive would crowd out such pro-social motiva-
tion (e.g., Frey 1997; Kreps 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Bowles and Polanía-
Reyes 2012), implying that one may prefer to outsource to NPOs services for which it is difficult to 
assess quality. NPOs could still outperform public sector delivery, because even if they may not distrib-
ute the residual returns (Hansmann 1980), they still have more incentives to reduce costs than a gov-
ernment agency that cannot go bankrupt and is restricted by bureaucratic rules (Stiglitz 1994).  
We evaluate the effectiveness of mandatory intensive counselling and training of long-term unemployed 
that the Public Employment Services (PES) in Flanders (Belgium) partly contracted out to private en-
terprises, both to FPOs and to NPOs. The simultaneous delivery of such services by public, private for-
profit and non-profit organisations provides a unique opportunity for testing theories about the relative 
efficiency of outsourcing of services traditionally provided for by the public sector. The quality of coun-
selling services is difficult to measure because it depends on the value added in terms of employability 
and job quality (as measured, e.g., by the duration of the employment relationship or the associated 
wage) relative to an unobservable counterfactual of no provision or of the provision of these services 
by another organisation type. Such counterfactuals are difficult to measure because they typically de-
pend partly on unobservable traits of the unemployed. Because consumers of counselling services have 
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notably little informational advantage in gauging the quality of these services relative to external ob-
servers, competition between private providers cannot therefore refrain from overinvestment in cost 
saving technologies. Nevertheless, because the public procurement of these employment services was 
a pilot project, announced to be followed by the tendering of similar services in the future, FPOs had 
incentives to deliver quality through reputation building. In addition, because counselling was targeted 
at the long-term unemployed to whom the PES did not offer any intensive employment service in the 
preceding two years, a pro-social mission is associated to the provision of these services, providing a 
case for the delivery of these services by NPOs.  
Empirical studies confirm that the effectiveness of outsourcing is indeed in general closely linked to the 
ease by which the quality of the service provision can be measured. In their survey study, Andersson 
and Jordahl (2011) conclude that the outsourcing of easily contractible services (such as garbage col-
lection) generally reduces costs without hurting quality. By contrast, for services that are more difficult 
to contract out (such as prisons and residential youth care), the evidence is more mixed. However, for 
employment services the evidence is more clear-cut.1 None of the available studies finds that outsourc-
ing of employment services to the private sector enhances overall performance. Winterhager (2006) 
and Bernhart and Wolff (2008) employed propensity score matching methods to evaluate the effective-
ness of outsourcing to the private sector of placement services for job seekers in Germany. They found 
that the private agencies were generally less effective than the PES. Recently, a number of researchers 
have conducted randomised trials to evaluate the effectiveness of contracting out employment services 
to the private sector. Bennmarker, Grönqvist and Öckert (2013) and Laun and Skogman Thoursie 
(2014) study the effectiveness of the contracting out of employment services to the unemployed and of 
the vocational rehabilitation for individuals on long-term sickness absence in Sweden relative to in-
house production by the public sector. Overall, they do not find a differential effect of these service 
providers. Similarly, Krug and Stephan (2013) report that the public provision of intensive placement 
services to the hard-to-place unemployed in Germany are at least as effective as those of private pro-
viders. Very recently, Rehwald, Rosholm and Svarer (2015) reported the results of a randomized ex-
periment conducted to determine the relative effectiveness of private and public providers of employ-
ment services for unemployed university graduates in Denmark. They conclude that private and public 
providers realized similar labour market outcomes at comparable costs. Finally, in an influential study 
Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand (2014) document that the public provision of counselling services to 
individuals at risk of long-term unemployment in France generates twice as large effects on the proba-
bility of finding employment than in the private provision. The authors attribute this lower performance 
of private providers partly to contractual incompleteness, especially in the form of “parking” of the most 
employable job seekers, i.e., by serving more employable job seekers less intensively than other (Kon-
ing and Heinrich 2013).2 However, another part of the lower achievement was caused by the lack of 
experience of these private providers relative to the PES. 
In the aforementioned studies evaluating the effectiveness of the contracting out of employment ser-
vices, either no mention was made of whether the private provider had a profit motive, or the majority 
were FPOs.3 Evidence on the performance of NPOs relative to FPOs is therefore sparse. Koning, 
                                                     
1
 See Rehwald, Rosholm and Svarer (2015) for a recent review of the literature. This review also mentions an early experimental 
study of Carcagno, Cecil and Ohls (1982) that shows that the use of private contractors for hard-to-place welfare recipients in the 
U.S. is not cost effective. In addition, it summarizes a Danish study of Skipper and Sørensen (2013). Based on statistical matching 
methods these researchers find that other actors (principally private firms) realize a lower employment rate six months after 
assignment than municipal job centres for placement services provided to unemployed workers. A cost-benefit analysis revealed 
that the lower cost of service provision by other providers could not compensate for this lower performance.    
2
 By contrast, the authors do not find much evidence of “cream-skimming” or “cherry picking”, which consists in selecting the 
most employable job seekers. 
3
 Laun and Skogman Thoursie (2014) mention in footnote 7: “Since almost 90 per cent of the participants received rehabilitation 
by a for-profit actor, profit maximisation seems like a valid benchmark for the private providers under study.” Behaghel, Crépon 
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Noailly and Visser (2007), reviewing this literature with regards to social services (hospitals, childcare 
and employment services), conclude that the performance of NPOs does not clearly differ from FPOs. 
The three studies focusing on employment services report mixed evidence, but Koning et al. alert the 
reader that these results should be interpreted cautiously because even if many conditioning variables 
are employed to control for the observed differences in the client composition between the two types of 
organisations, clients could still differ in unobservable characteristics, such as motivation and health. 
Heinrich (2000) finds no differential selection or placement rate between service providers under the 
U.S. Job training Partnership Act of 1982 (JPTA). By contrast, Stoll, Melendez and de Montrichard 
(2003), studying training provision under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) in the U.S., and Koning 
(2008), evaluating the relative effectiveness of training providers to welfare recipients in the Nether-
lands, conclude that FPOs “cherry pick” the best clients. These authors find some evidence that FPOs 
realise lower (long-run) placement rates than NPOs. 
We contribute to this literature in the following ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
evaluate simultaneously the relative performance of the three types of providers of employment ser-
vices: public, private for-profit and private non-profit. Second, we not only study the effects on the job 
finding rate and the probability of withdrawal from the labour force in a competing risks framework but 
also examine the effect on the employment stability. Third, in our analysis, we explicitly consider unob-
served differences in the client composition of the three service providers. To this end, we base our 
analysis on the “timing-of-events” method (Abbring and Van den Berg 2003). This method exploits that 
the timing of treatment by one of the three providers is partly random, and not anticipated. If the transi-
tion intensities to the various labour market and treatment states are of the mixed proportional form 
(MPH), the treatment effects can be identified. However, in our timing-of-events model, identification 
does not crucially hinge on the MPH assumption. The way in which the programme is implemented 
delivers a number of novel exclusion restrictions that help identifying the causal treatment effects. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional setting, 
and in Section 3, we present the data employed in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the em-
pirical strategy. Section 5 reports the empirical findings, and Section 6 the conclusions. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
In Belgium, a worker is entitled to Unemployment Insurance (UI) in two instances: (i) after graduation 
from school conditional on a waiting period of nine months;4 (ii) after involuntary dismissal in case of a 
minimum contribution record to qualify. In contrast to many other countries, there is no time limit on the 
payment of Unemployment Benefits (UB).5 School-leavers are entitled to flat rate benefits while dis-
missed workers earn a gross replacement rate ranging between 40% and 60% of past earnings, which 
is bracketed by a floor and a cap. The benefit level depends on the household type (head of household, 
cohabitant or single) and on unemployment duration for dismissed singles and cohabitants. 
UI is organised at the federal level, while the PES are decentralised to the three Regions: Flanders, 
                                                     
and Gurgand (2014, p. 146) report that the private providers are one of the following: temporary agencies, specialised consultan-
cies or international placement firms. This suggests that these providers are FPOs.    
4
 Since January 2012, this waiting period has been increased to 12 months. 
5
 Since January 2012, a time limit of three years has been imposed on some categories entitled to UI after graduation. 
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Wallonia and Brussels. UI pays out the unemployment benefits, verifies compliance to the eligibility 
requirements and issues sanctions in case of non-compliance. The PES organise counselling, job 
search assistance, intermediation services and training of unemployed and employed workers. The 
Regional PES transmit information to the federal UI with respect to the requirement to be “available for 
the labour market”, i.e., registration as a job searcher, turning down a suitable job offer or refusing job 
search assistance. In the sequel, we will focus our discussion on the functioning of the PES in Flanders 
because our analysis is restricted to this region. 
2.1 The Context of the Public Tender  
The PES traditionally provided its services in-house. To increase capacity, since 1992, the PES started 
outsourcing specific services, such as counselling and training, to private NPOs. The interest of policy 
makers in the growing contracting out of these services in countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, made the contracting out of employment services to the private sector 
one of the policy objectives of the Flemish government at its formation in 2004. This led to the launch 
in 2005 of a first call for tenders to procure these services to the private sector.6 This first public tender 
is the one that we evaluate in this study. It procured the provision of employment services to the long-
term unemployed to whom the PES did not propose any employment services in the preceding two 
years, the so called curative group. The interest in this target group must be observed within the context 
of an important reform of UI in 2004. By this reform, the federal government introduced in UI the moni-
toring of job search effort of the long-term unemployed benefit recipients combined with sanctions in 
case of non-compliance (Cockx, Defourny, Dejemeppe and Van der Linden 2007; Cockx, Dejemeppe, 
Launov and Van der Linden 2011; Cockx and Dejemeppe 2012). This introduction of more coercion 
was heavily debated in the press and by pressure groups. To accommodate the concerns of critics and 
to align with the European guidelines for employment that all unemployed should be counselled or 
activated as soon as possible, the federal government decided to stimulate by means of subsidies, 
among other, the supply of the regional employment services. The Flemish government determined 
that its PES would primarily allocate this subsidy to placement and training services for the aforemen-
tioned curative group, which the mentioned monitoring scheme would subsequently target. As such, 
the regional government aimed at providing opportunities to this target group to comply with the new 
federally imposed job search requirements and hence, to avoid sanctions. Initially, from 2004 until 2006, 
the regional PES delivered these services only in-house, but to enhance capacity, subsequently (until 
2008), it contracted out, by means of the aforementioned public call for tenders, part of these services 
to private providers.  
2.2 The Treatment for the Curative Group  
Irrespectively of whether the employment services to the curative group were provided in-house or 
externally, their allocation and implementation occurred according to the following stages.  
(i) Labelling 
Starting in February 2004, on the 15th of each month, the computer system of the central administration 
of the PES identified and labelled all individuals belonging to the curative group, i.e., individuals who 
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 A detailed description of this tendering process and its outcome can be found in Devisscher, Sanders and Van Pelt (2009). 
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(a) were UI recipient at that moment, (b) registered in the PES as a job seeker for at least 15 or 21 
months, for those younger, or older than 25, respectively, and (c) were not offered any counselling or 
training in the past two years. In the first year, the labelling was restricted to individuals younger than 
30. From March 2005 onwards, those aged between 30 and 40 were included in the target group. 
Finally, starting in January 2006, individuals aged between 40 and 50 have also been considered. Job 
seekers older than 50 have never participated in the programme. The last labels were set in December 
2007. In February 2004, March 2005 and January 2006, many more individuals were labelled than in 
the other months. This is because at those dates eligible individuals comprised the stock of job seekers 
who had been unemployed for more than 15 or 21 months on those dates, while in the other (subse-
quent) months only those flowing into the 21st month of unemployment were labelled.7 We will incorpo-
rate individuals in the stock in the empirical analysis and argue in Section 4.2 that these individuals will 
provide a valuable additional source for the identification of the treatment effects.  
(ii) Orientation and “qualifying intake” 
The list of labelled individuals was sent to the 13 local offices of the PES. These offices subsequently 
invited the job seekers to a sequence of partly collective (groups of approximately 10 individuals) and 
partly individual meetings and training sessions. This orientation stage was usually organised during 
five full days. Participants were informed about the available services offered by the PES and the em-
ployment perspectives and supported in improving work attitudes and in identifying realistic job targets 
given their acquired competencies. At the end of this orientation stage, a “qualifying intake” took place. 
At this intake, the job seeker met a caseworker to evaluate whether and, if so, which additional training 
was required for the identified job targets, and a theoretical pathway to the identified job targets was 
drawn up. Note that not all members of the curative target group were invited to participate in the ori-
entation stage,8 but all of them were invited to the qualifying intake meeting.  
(iii) Assignment to the provider (internal or external) 
Shortly after the orientation stage, the job seeker was assigned to the treatment, offered either in-house 
or, from January 2006 onwards, by an external provider to which the placement services were tendered. 
The external providers could not refuse any assigned client, but not all labelled individuals were eligible 
for outsourcing: Those unemployed with problems unrelated to the labour market (e.g., addiction or 
psychological problems) or those facing unemployment traps (e.g., because of disability or wage con-
fiscation) could only receive an in-house treatment.9 This finding means that those eligible for outsourc-
ing were positively selected among the curative group. Because the data did not allow us to identify this 
eligible group, it is essential to base the empirical analysis on a method that can control for this selection 
on unobservables. 
(iv)-(v) Action plan and phase 
At the start of the treatment, the internal or external caseworker should take the theoretical pathway 
determined at the end of the orientation stage as given and convert it into a concrete action plan to be 
signed by both parties. Subsequently, the training, if required, and employment services comprising 
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 In Section 3.2, we explain that aforementioned conditions (a) and (c) complicate the analyses, since they imply that part of the 
stock could also be labelled beyond the starting date of labelling for the corresponding age class.  
8
 E.g., those who are insufficiently proficient in Dutch are not invited to participate in the orientation stage 
9
 “Job ready” individuals do not receive any treatment, but the share of these among the eligible long-term unemployed is likely 
to be negligible. 
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intensive counselling were delivered. Various types of training could be provided such as training in job 
search, vocational competencies, social competencies, communication, work attitudes, language and 
ICT. Counselling consisted essentially in the provision of intensive advice and follow-up in job search 
activities, but could also comprise using the counsellor’s network to search jobs on behalf of the client 
and in coaching for job interviews.  
(vi) End of the treatment and possible follow-up 
Six months after the end of the last training programme, or after the assignment if no training was 
provided, the treatment, irrespectively of its outcome, was formally ended. The follow-up after the treat-
ment was predominantly limited to the administrative registration of the labour market status. 
Participation in the treatment was mandatory. If the unemployed did not show up at the orientation 
sessions or did not collaborate in the realisation of the action plan, this information was to be transmitted 
to the federal UI agency that could initiate sanctions. Private providers had to report violations with 
these requirements through the Regional PES. In this respect, the providers had the same type of 
leverage toward the unemployed as had the PES. 
2.3 The Features of the Public Tender 
As mentioned, the PES launched a public call for tenders on July 15, 2005 as to increase capacity of 
the programme targeted to the curative group. The call aimed at the delivery of 6,000 counselling and 
training pathways between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009 and was divided up into 14 lots 
(two per sub-region).10 The number of tendered pathways in each sub-region varied between 650 and 
1,210. The tenders were procured in one stage. Providers were only retained if they satisfied a number 
of formal criteria, such as being legally authorised and possessing certain quality labels for the provision 
of employment services, and if they could demonstrate experience with the counselling of job seekers. 
In each sub-region, the tender was then awarded to the two of the overall best performing providers on 
the following four selection criteria: description of the implementation methods (50%); expertise, as 
apparent from past experience and from the competence of case workers (20%); the location of service 
provision (accessibility by public transport) (10%); and the price (20%). 
Ninety-two bids were submitted by 24 private FPOs and NPOs. Most NPOs formed consortia because 
individual organisations did not have the capacity to supply the required number of tendered pathways 
in each lot, while FPOs usually operated as single providers. Eventually, the 14 tenders were awarded 
to 10 bidders: 4 to FPOs, 5 to NPOs and 1 to a consortium in which an FPO subcontracted partly to an 
NPO.11 The NPOs were organisations that had expertise in the provision of counselling and other em-
ployment services for socially disadvantaged as well as for other groups typically, but not exclusively, 
commissioned by the public sector. FPOs were quite large companies, also active in neighbouring 
countries, offering various types of human resources services, such as recruitment, selection, outplace-
ment and temporary work. Among the tendered organisations, the NPOs generally outperformed the 
FPOs with regards to the selection criteria concerning expertise and location, while the FPOs obtained 
better average scores on implementation methods and on the price. 
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 The operation of the PES is decentralized into 13 districts. Because the scale of some of these districts was too small, some 
of these districts were required to cooperate in the context of this tender and hence, grouped into 7 sub-regions.   
11
 The data allow distinguishing between the FPOs and NPOs within this consortium, which is what we do in the analysis. 
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Based on costs calculated for comparable pathways of employment services in the PES, the call posted 
a reference unit price of 2,757.5 € (excluding VAT), but the bid prices could deviate from this reference 
price. This bid price did not depend on the nature of treatment (e.g., whether training was included or 
whether counselling was provided individually or in group).12 The major share (70%) of this price was 
fixed. This means that the incentive scheme was very low-powered. For instance, in the studies that 
evaluated the outsourcing of employment services and that were reviewed in the Introduction, this fixed 
share varied between 0% and at most 45%, for the outsourcing of vocational rehabilitation for individuals 
on long-term sickness absences (Laun and Skogman Thoursie 2014). The remaining 30% of the pay-
ment was proportional to a sub-regional specific target exit rate from registered unemployment to be 
attained in each of following three moments: at the end of the treatment (as defined above) and in the 
two subsequent months. The target exit rate was calculated by the PES on a comparable in-house 
treatment in the preceding years. This rate was set to 50%, on average, ranging between 45% in Lim-
burg and 56% in Antwerp. In case the provider managed to attain a placement rate of 3 percentage 
points above the target, a bonus of 500€ was paid per placement above the target. Note that the target 
specified an exit rate from registered unemployment and not a transition to employment. Labour force 
exits, therefore, also contribute positively to the outcome indicator. In view of the aforementioned par-
allel introduction of the job search-monitoring scheme, this is not innocuous. We will return to this issue 
when we interpret our findings. 
The target rates seemed to be set at relatively high levels. Ex post, the average exit rate over external 
providers turned out to be only 43.1%. In only 4 of the 14 lots, the target was attained, and the bonus 
was only paid to one provider in the sub-region with the lowest target rate. Despite this low level of 
performance, no provider was paid less than 88% of the unit price.13 This is the consequence of the 
low-powered incentive payment. This induces private providers to just offer a minimum of services to 
the job seeker, referred to as “parking” (e.g., Koning and Heinrich 2013), that is, to collect the fixed 
payment per enrolled individual.14 Even if we find some evidence of such behaviour (see Section 5.1), 
our evaluation reveals that the private providers did not perform worse than the public one, and the 
FPOs performed even better, so contractual incompleteness does not appear to have a major impact 
on the effectiveness of service provision. One reason is that private contractors had an interest in build-
ing a good reputation because the public tender was announced to be the first in a series; therefore, 
the awarding of future contracts was at stake. Further explanations are discussed in Section 5.1. 
An important issue in this tendering was that the call did not clearly state that the price including the 
VAT rate of 21% mattered at selection. This mattered because all but one of the NPOs were exempted 
from VAT. Eventually, four of ten non-profit providers would not have been awarded the lot if VAT had 
have been included in the evaluation of the price (Devisscher, Sanders and Van Pelt 2009, p. 64). 
However, the appeals lodged by the losing bidders were dismissed (Ibid, p. 52). As a consequence, the 
dispersion of the prices excluding VAT of the winning bids was substantial: between 2,350€ and 3,300€. 
Moreover, the NPOs that were exempted from VAT all offered a price excluding VAT that was strictly 
(on average 17.8%) higher than the price of any of the FPOs: on average, 3,058€ compared to 2,595€.15 
The NPOs without VAT exemption offered the same price as the highest one among the FPOs, which 
was equal to the reference unit price of 2,757.5€. Overall, the average unit price of NPOs was 2,936€, 
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 The call mentioned that one should aim at including training in 69% of the treatments, but there was no sanction if this objective 
was not attained. In Table 1 below, we report that only between 38% and 48% of the treatments included training.   
13
 This lowest performing provider obtained an exit rate that was only 60.2% of the target. The payment is then 
(0.602*0.30+0.70)*100% = 88.1% of the unit price. 
14
 The selection of job seekers with the most favourable labour market perspectives, the so-called “creaming” or “cherry picking” 
is not an issue here, because the incentive scheme is relatively low powered and more importantly, because the private providers 
could not refuse job seekers that the PES assigned to them. 
15
 These are weighted averages: Each provider is weighted according to the fraction of pathways it has been commissioned. 
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13.1% and 6.5% higher than, respectively, that of the FPOs and the reference price of the PES.16 The 
unit prices that were actually paid after performance measurement were, however, on average lower 
than the aforementioned bid unit prices, because the majority of the external organisations did not attain 
the target placement rates. Because NPOs performed better with respect to this target, the divergence 
between the FPOs and NPOs is even larger if we consider the ex-post unit remuneration per client 
(excl. VAT). For NPOs this price was on average 2,860€, while for FPO it attained only 2,448€. Based 
on the actual remuneration the NPOs were therefore even 16.8% more expensive than the FPOs.  
We must be cautious when making cost comparisons between the private providers and the PES. Be-
cause the PES could not provide us with the true cost of their service provision, we use the reference 
price that the PES mentioned in the call for tender as an estimate of the true unit cost. This reference 
price was calculated on the estimated costs that the PES incurred on 5,000 pathways on a similar 
population in 2003 and 2004 and, hence seems a reasonable approximation. Based on the eventual 
ex-post remuneration and this reference price, NPOs were 3.7% more expensive than the PES and the 
FPOs were 11.2% cheaper. We will show below that FPOs are significantly more effective than the 
PES, while NPOs do not significantly improve upon the PES. Based on these results we will conclude 
that the FPOs are the most efficient providers. This conclusion is robust for the true cost of public service 
provision not being more than 11.2% below the reference price.   
3. DATA 
3.1 Informational Content of the Data 
We base our analysis on administrative data that we obtained from the PES regarding the curative 
group labelled between March 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007. These data inform about the exact 
dates at which the unemployed (i) were (re-)enrolled as job seekers, (ii) were labelled as members of 
the curative group, (iii) entered the orientation stage,17 and (iv) were assigned to a commissioned ex-
ternal provider. However, in case employment services were decided to be offered in-house, it is un-
known when this decision was taken. Consequently, in the analysis, we must assume that the in-house 
treatment by the PES begins for all unemployed at the start of the orientation stage. This approach 
means that we ignore potential differential effects of the in-house treatment within and after the orien-
tation stage. We believe that this simplifying assumption is not so strong because the treatment in the 
orientation stage only lasted 5 days and we know from informal contacts with PES employees that both 
the in-house and outsourced treatments started very shortly afterwards. In fact, for outsourced treat-
ments, we do observe the moment of assignment to the external provider: more than 56% of the unem-
ployed assigned to an external provider start their treatment within a month of the start of the orientation 
stage, and 90% within three months. The data also allow identifying the type of external providers, i.e., 
NPO or FPO. In addition, we know whether the treatment of the curative group involved participation in 
training, and, only for the external providers, whether counselling was provided individually, in group, 
or both. In the causal analysis, we distinguish between treatments only according to the type of provider 
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 Because we lack information on the effective cost of the in-house service provision, we assume that the average unit price of 
the PES is equal to the historically determined reference unit price of 2,757.5€. 
17
 In case the orientation stage did not take place, the date at which the intake took place is retained.   
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(public, NPO or FPO), but the further qualifying information of the treatments is employed in the inter-
pretation of the causal analysis. 
The data report whether the unemployed is still registered at the end of each month as an unemployed 
job seeker at the PES and, if not, whether exit was to employment (possibly part-time) or to another 
destination, i.e., “out of labour force”. These exits are registered up to six years after labelling. All data 
are right censored on May 31, 2011. In our analysis, participants in training programmes are assimilated 
to unemployed (treated) job seekers and hence, not considered to have left the labour force. In addition, 
we ignore any exit from unemployment lasting less than three months. We do so because (i) the PES 
registers re-enrolments only if the previous enrolment did not take place within the three preceding 
months, (ii) the unemployment duration thresholds of 15 and 21 months utilized in the determination of 
the curative group (see Section 2.2) are also measured disregarding these temporary exits, and (iii) the 
target outcome on which the performance payment was based on such a definition of exit (see Section 
2.3). Consequently, an “unemployment spell” in the analysis may consist of a sequence of brief unem-
ployment and employment spells, and employment and inactivity spells always last at least three 
months.  
The local office in which the unemployed is registered at the moment of labelling is known and condi-
tioned upon in the analysis below. This conditioning may matter because the 13 local offices have a 
certain degree of autonomy with respect to operational decisions regarding service provision. The data 
contain, furthermore, information on individual characteristics, such as gender, age, having a migrant 
background, being disabled, level of education, fluency in Dutch, knowledge of foreign languages and 
possessing a driver’s licence. We also include monthly information on the provincial unemployment 
rates since January 1, 1986. 
We can only rely on the administrative data of the PES. This means that we are neither informed about 
the monitoring of job search effort nor about the level of unemployment benefits because this infor-
mation is only available at the federal UI agency. Moreover, we cannot reconstruct the labour market 
histories for individuals who are no longer registered at the regional PES. We cannot, therefore, meas-
ure the effect of the employment services on wages or on other features determining the quality of 
employment. However, this quality can be proxied by the time that elapses between the transition to 
employment and the moment of re-enrolment in registered unemployment, i.e., by what we call “em-
ployment stability”. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Between March 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007, 61,137 labels were set to the curative group, and 
5,986 individuals were assigned to treatment by external private providers. However, for a number of 
reasons, we do not retain all these labelled individuals for analysis. We explain these reasons in this 
section.  
First, because individuals could temporarily leave unemployment after being labelled, but before being 
treated, they could be labelled more than once. We chose to right censor data once an individual was 
labelled for a second time. This reduces the sample to 58,391 individuals, among whom 5,707 were 
contracted out. Second, among this group, 5,079 (among whom 913 were contracted out) were labelled 
because they did not meet the search requirements in the job search-monitoring scheme of the federal 
UI (Section 2.2). We do not retain these individuals in our analysis because it is difficult to separately 
identify the effect of the employment services from the impact of the monitoring scheme. Third, because 
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hardly no (50) individuals were outsourced if the labelling occurred before March 2005 and after March 
2007, we disregard the 18,519 individuals who were labelled in this period. Fourth, unemployed younger 
than (older than) 25 were labelled after an unemployment duration of 15 (21) months. As only relatively 
few (410) unemployed aged less than 25 were outsourced, we disregard these individuals because this 
complicates the selection rule to be modelled. Additional complications in the selection rule have forced 
us to narrow the sample size further down. This is explained in the following paragraphs. 
The data retained for the analysis concern individuals older than 25 who were labelled between March 
2005 and March 2007. In Section 2.2, we explained that selection requires at the instant of labelling 
individuals to be (a) UI recipient, (b) unemployed for at least 21 months, and (c) not having been offered 
any counselling pathway or training programme in the past two years. Let us first focus on condition (b) 
and disregard conditions (a) and (c). Because for those aged between 30 and 40 (40 and 50) labelling 
started in March 15, 2005 (January 15, 2006), the data should consist of the stock of individuals for 
whom the unemployment duration strictly exceeds 21 months at these two starting dates and the flow 
of individuals entering the 22nd month of unemployment during the remaining labelling period.18 Stock 
sampling induces a length and interruption bias (Salant 1977). It is well known how to consider this in 
duration analysis (Lancaster 1979; Nickell 1979, Ridder 1984). However, the selection rule is compli-
cated by two matters.  
First, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the PES employs a definition of unemployment duration that allows 
temporary interruptions of less than three months. Consequently, an individual could be unemployed 
for more than 21 months, but not labelled because the individual is not unemployed at the moment at 
which the labelling occurs and hence, does not satisfy condition (a). Someone who is unemployed for 
more than 21 months may not be labelled for a second reason. She may have been offered a counsel-
ling or training pathway within the preceding two years, i.e., condition (c) is not satisfied. Both conditions, 
(a) and (c), can, however, be satisfied at a later point in time. This explains why we observe beyond the 
start of the labelling period in March 2005 and January 2006 individuals who are labelled at unemploy-
ment durations strictly larger than 21 months. Because conditions (a) and (c) induce complicated se-
lection rules that are difficult to model, we exclude from the sample of analysis individuals who are 
labelled at an unemployment duration strictly larger than 22 months after March 15, 2005 (January 15, 
2006) for those aged between 30 and 40 (40 and 50). This further reduces the sample size by 11,790 
individuals among whom 1,876 were outsourced. 
Finally, we drop 2,438 (of whom 411 are outsourced) for which some information is missing or incon-
sistent. This step leads to a final sample of 16,157 unemployed individuals, among whom 5,336 are not 
treated, because they left unemployment or they entered a training programme between labelling and 
the orientation stage,19 1,981 are contracted out to private providers (1,167 to FPOs and 814 to NPOs), 
and 8,840 are offered in-house employment services.  
Sample Selectivity?  
A concern is that by this sample selection our analysis would no longer be representative of the pro-
gramme. We therefore include in Table A.2 in the Appendix the same descriptive summary statistics for 
the population of interest as those reported in Table 1 in Section 3.3 for the sample of analysis. The 
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 As aforementioned, to be labelled, unemployment duration must exceed 21 months. 
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 A limited number of individuals participate in training before the orientation stage or after completing the pathway for the 
curative group. This usually happens if participation is initiated by the unemployed rather than by the case-worker. To avoid that 
the effect of this training contaminates the treatment effect of interest, we right censor the unemployment spells of these individ-
uals at the start of the training programme. 
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population of interest is the unemployed who have been labelled between March 1, 2005 and March 
31, 2007, were older than 25 at labelling and were not labelled because they did not meet the search 
requirements in the job search-monitoring scheme of the federal UI (Section 2.2). This population com-
prises 31,938 individuals of whom 4,610 were outsourced to private providers (2,784 to FPOs and 1,826 
to NPOs), 17,522 were allocated in-house services and 9,806 did not receive a treatment. A comparison 
of Tables 1 and A.2 reveals that the composition is broadly quite similar for the population of interest 
and our sample. Nevertheless, the sample of analysis is somewhat older, contains a notably lower 
fraction of individuals with migrant background and of individuals with the lowest level of education, 
especially among the treated groups. The fraction of the pathways including training is somewhat lower 
in the sample of analysis, but the relative position of the three providers is not affected. In addition, the 
counselling technology hardly differs. Finally, the distribution of the unemployed over the districts is very 
similar.20  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Observed Individual Characteristics and of Features of the Treat-
ment. The Sample of Analysis 
Treatment Status: All Untreated FPO NPO PES 
A. Individual characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Woman 0.578 0.602 0.526 0.565 0.572 
Migrant background 0.152 0.145 0.139 0.085 0.165 
Disabled 0.282 0.189 0.075 0.138 0.379 
Driver's licence 0.663 0.682 0.722 0.724 0.638 
Proficient in Dutch 0.750 0.779 0.823 0.796 0.719 
Number of languages in which proficient 1.389 1.480 1.66 1.357 1.302 
Education      
    primary/lower secondary (< grade 10) 0.350 0.330 0.335 0.362 0.363 
    secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12) 0.291 0.285 0.264 0.310 0.297 
    secondary (≥ grade 12) 0.260 0.278 0.267 0.241 0.250 
    tertiary (bachelor or master) 0.098 0.107 0.134 0.087 0.090 
Age at labelling (years) 41.2 40.2 43.0 44.2 41.4 
B. Time-varying variables Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 8.50% 8.60% 8.40% 8.30% 8.50% 
C. Features of the treatment Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Treatment beyond the orientation stage   
    Training included in pathway* - - 0.484 0.378 0.387 
    Only counselling* - - 0.516 0.622 0.613 
Type of counselling     
    Individual - - 0.386 0.639 NA 
    in group - - 0.546 0.000 NA 
    individual and in group - - 0.069 0.361 NA 
Number of individuals: 16,157 5,336 1,167 814 8,840 
Notes: * Calculated on the basis of non-missing missing information. For the external providers this information was missing for 
only 3% of the participants. However, for the in-house provision by the PES this information was lacking for 42% of the partici-
pants and is, hence, less reliable. NA = not available. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains for the sample retained for the analysis summary, statistics of observed individual 
characteristics and of features of the treatment. The first column reports the overall mean, while the 
subsequent columns display this information for four groups, according to their treatment status: those 
who left unemployment or participated in training before the orientation stage and hence, before treat-
ment starts, i.e. the “untreated”, those who were contracted out to FPOs or to NPOs, and those for 
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 The distribution over the districts is not reported in the Appendix, but can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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whom services were provided in-house by the PES. We focus our discussion on the last three columns 
because a comparison between these treatments is at the core of our analysis. 
Individual characteristics 
We mentioned in Section 2.2 that those eligible for outsourcing were positively selected among the total 
curative group. The summary statistics reported in Panel A of Table 1 confirm this. Relatively to those 
who were assigned to outside providers, the clients of the PES are overrepresented among generally 
less employable groups than average – such as women, those with a migrant background, the disabled 
and the low educated – and underrepresented among more employable groups – such as individuals 
with a driver’s licence and those proficient in languages. Conflicting with this general pattern, we find, 
however, that unemployed receiving in-house treatment are, on average, younger. 
Second, as to the assignment of individuals to the different outside providers (FPOs or NPOs), practice 
differed somewhat between the different local PES offices. In general, caseworkers were reported to 
assign relatively randomly, be it that mobility difficulties were considered and that some offices tended 
to match the profile of the unemployed to the expertise of the provider (Devisscher, Sanders and Van 
Pelt 2009, p. 99-100). Nevertheless, even if the difference is not so stark as between the public and 
private providers, in addition to having proportionally more clients with a migrant background, the clients 
of FPOs appear generally somewhat more employable than the clients of NPOs. On average, these 
clients were less disabled, more proficient in languages, higher educated and slightly younger. This 
bias is potentially related to the reputation of NPOs in being strong in serving hard-to-place clients. 
Features of the treatment 
The service technology clearly differed significantly between FPOs and NPOs. FPOs included more 
training in the pathway to employment: 48.4% versus 37.8%.21 In addition, and more clearly, a high 
share (54.6%) of the FPO clients were not provided with any individual counselling at all, while all NPO 
clients were at least partly counselled individually, and a vast majority of them (61.6%) were only coun-
selled individually. By including more training, FPOs increased the cost of their service technology rel-
ative to that of NPOs. However, this appears to have been more than compensated by the cheaper 
group counselling: The eventual tendered price was uniformly lower for the FPOs (see Section 2.3).  
The services of the PES were decentralised into 13 district offices, while in the call for tendering, the 
service provision was grouped into seven sub-regions. To consider heterogeneity in functioning of the 
local offices, we included the district in which the unemployed was registered at labelling as control 
variables in the analysis. In Table A.1 in Appendix A.1, we report how the unemployed in the retained 
sample are distributed according to treatment status over these districts. From this table, it can be 
deduced that in West-Flanders (including Brugge, Kortrijk-Roeselare and Oostende-Ieper), no services 
were outsourced to FPOs, while in Ghent’s district office, none to NPOs. In Section 4, we explain how 
these exclusion restrictions can aid in identifying the causal treatment effects. 
Timing of the labelling, treatments and (un)employment duration  
Figure 1 graphically summarises the timing of the labelling and the treatments within an unemployment 
spell. At time zero, an individual registers at the PES as an unemployed job seeker. The labelling takes 
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 The PES included training in 38.7% of their pathways. This suggests a similar mix as the one offered by the NPO. However, 
because of the large share of missing information, we should be cautious with this interpretation.   
 13 
place at , the 15th of each month. To be labelled, the individual must be entitled to UI, unemployment 
duration must exceed 21 months ( ≥ 21), and there may not have been any participation in a coun-
selling pathway or training in the preceding two years (Section 2.2). We distinguish between the stock 
and the flow. The stock is the group of individuals who were labelled at the start of the observation 
period (i.e., March 15, 2005 or January 15, 2006). For these individuals, the unemployment duration 
may exceed 22 months. By contrast, individuals in the flow are labelled in any subsequent month until 
the last labelling moment on March 15, 2007. The unemployment duration of individuals in the flow 
sample will never exceed 22 months because otherwise, they would have been labelled in the preceding 
month: 21 ≤  < 22. Subsequently, if she did not leave unemployment or participated in training before, 
at a moment randomly determined by the administrative process T122 months later, the labelled individ-
ual is selected for the orientation stage; T2 months later, some of these individuals, again if they did not 
leave unemployment before, are assigned to an external private provider or an internal service of the 
PES. This defines the starting point of the treatment by the FPOs or NPOs. Because we do not observe 
T2 in case the counselling or training is offered in-house by the PES and because during the orientation 
stage, all individuals (outsourced or not) receive some in-house public services, we define t0+T1 as the 
starting point of the treatment by the PES. Finally, unemployment is left after Tu months. In Figure 1, it 
is assumed that Tu >t0+T1+T2.  
Figure 1: Timing of the Labelling and Treatment in the Unemployment Spell 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the timing of labelling and treatments as well as on (un)employ-
ment duration. The median unemployment duration at labelling is much higher than 21 months.23 This 
reflects that a major share (81%) is sampled from the stock. Median elapsed unemployment duration is 
very similar for the three different providers. It ranges between 46.3 months and 47.2 months. About 
six to eight months later, the orientation phase takes place and the treatment of the PES starts. These 
statistics demonstrate that there is no strong selection in provider types based on elapsed unemploy-
ment duration. 
The middle panel of Table 2 displays the first quartiles of the time from labelling until (i) the start of the 
PES treatment (=T1), (ii) the start of the outsourced treatment (=T1+T2), and (iii) the exit from unemploy-
ment (=Tu-t0). In addition, we report the first quartiles of the latent durations until exit to employment 
(=Tue-t0) and out of the labour force (=Tuo-t0). The latent duration measures the duration until exit to a 
particular destination, conditional on not exiting to any other destination. In the case that exit destina-
tions are competing risks, a latent (unobserved) duration is always longer than the realised (observed) 
one, because in contrast to the latter, it does not end in case of exit to any other destination. The survival 
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 We denote random variables by capital letters and their realisations by lower case letters. 
23
 As aforementioned, according to our definition, unemployment duration is not reset to zero if interruptions last less than three 
months. 
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rate of a latent duration can be estimated by a Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimator in which exits to the 
competing destinations are treated as right censored observations. We report here the first quartiles 
instead of the medians because for the exit from unemployment, all the observations are right censored 
before the median duration is attained. This reflects that the sample is composed of individuals with 
extremely low exit rates from unemployment. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of (Un)employment Duration and Timing of Treatments (in Months) 
within the Sample of Analysis. 
Treatment Status: All Untreated FPO NPO PES 
A. Unemployment duration Median Median Median Median Median 
At labelling (=t0) 44.6 40 46.3 47.2 46.5 
At orientation/intake (=t0+T1) - - 54.1 53.1 54.1 
B. Time from labelling until* 1st quartile 1st quartile 1st quartile 1st quartile 1st quartile 
Orientation/intake (=T1) - - 3.8 2.4 2.5 
Outsourcing to private provider (=T1+T2) - - 5.2 3.6 - 
Exit from unemployment^ (=Tu-t0) 11.9 5.3 18.8 19.3 16.7 
To employment^ (=Tue-t0) 34.4 26.6 23.3 29.8 60.3 
Out of the labour force^ (=Tuo-t0) 33.5 10.2 >74§ >74§ 49 
C. Time from exit to employment until Median Median Median Median Median 
Re-entry in unemployment^ (=Teu) 13 13 12 10 13 
Notes. * We evaluate at the first quartile, since for the exit from unemployment, everyone is right censored before the median 
duration. ^ Kaplan Meier estimate that takes right censoring into account. § All observations are right censored before the first 
quartile. At 74 months the 21.0 percentile for FPO, and the 24.2 percentile for NPO is attained. 
Remarkably, even if the descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggested that the clients of the in-house ser-
vices were on average less employable than the clients of the private providers, their unemployment 
duration since the start of the treatment (16.7-2.5=14.2 months) is the shortest among the three provid-
ers. This can be explained as follows. Observe that, in line with expectations, the latent duration until 
exit to employment is indeed longer. Hence, the observed unemployment duration is shorter because 
this group withdraws more rapidly from the labour force. This is consistent with the fact that a sizeable 
fraction of these unemployed face problems unrelated to the labour market and that the introduction of 
the job search-monitoring scheme at the federal UI hence may have led to more sanctions and with-
drawals from the labour market than for the clients of the private providers. The observation that the 
clients of the public provider remain employed longer (last line in Table 2) is probably just a reflection 
of the fact that only a very selective subgroup of more employable individuals manages to find a job.  
In the descriptive comparison of the performance of FPOs relative to NPOs, it is striking that the unem-
ployment duration since assignment to treatment is more than two months shorter for the clients of the 
FPOs (18.8-5.2=13.6 months) than of the NPOs (19.3-3.6=15.7 months). For the speed at which un-
employment is left for employment, this difference is even more pronounced, i.e., 8.1 months.24 More-
over, even if the first quartile durations until withdrawal from the labour force is unobserved, we can 
deduce from the preceding figures that clients of FPOs exit from the labour force more slowly than 
clients of NPOs. Finally, employment durations for those who find a job are longer for FPO clients. 
These differences are surely partly explainable by the more favourable characteristics of the clients of 
FPOs (see Table 1). Determining whether (un)observed characteristics account for these differences 
and those mentioned in the previous paragraph is a main research objective. 
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 For the NPOs, we have 29.8-3.6=26.2, while for the FPOs we obtain 23.3-5.2=18.1 months; 26.2-18.1=8.1 months. 
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In this section, we describe the transition process that we model, how the treatment effect is identified, 
and how we account for the fact that the sampling occurs at labelling and not at entry in unemployment. 
Our discussion on the identification of the econometric model focuses on the justification of the non-
anticipation assumption and the explanation of the novel exclusion restrictions that relax our reliance 
on the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) assumption. Appendix A.2 contains the underlying formal 
econometric model and assumptions, some complementary discussion of the identification and the der-
ivation of the log-likelihood function. Furthermore, in Appendix A.3, we explain how we simulate the 
model. These simulations are employed to generate some goodness-of-fit statistics (reported in Appen-
dix A.5) and a number of summary measures of counterfactual treatment effects that facilitate their 
interpretation (reported in Section 5). 
4.1 Description of the Modelled Transition Process 
The econometric model describes the transition process by means of a sequence of partly competing 
risks duration models. Figure 2 represents this transition process. At labelling, all individuals are unem-
ployed. From that moment, an individual is subject to three competing risks: she can exit unemployment 
() by (i) finding employment lasting three months or more (	) or (ii) leaving the labour force	(); or (iii) 
she can remain unemployed and start receiving the in-house treatment by the PES (). Out of the labour 
force is modelled as an absorbing state. By contrast, if an individual finds a job, the transition back to 
unemployment is modelled. In case the individual starts the in-house treatment, the additional exit des-
tinations open up: treatment by a FPO () or by a NPO (). Finally, once treated by the external provid-
ers, the number of exit destinations drops back to the two initial ones, i.e., to  and 	.  
This competing risks duration model is assumed to be of the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) form. 
This means that observed and unobserved explanatory variables and the lagged durations until treat-
ment (t1, t2) and until exit from unemployment (tu) proportionally shift the transition intensities to the 
various destinations. The time-constant observed explanatory variables retained for the analysis are 
the individual characteristics reported in Panel A of Table 1 to which the square of age and the unem-
ployment rate in the province of living at the start of the unemployment spell (Panel B of Table 1) are 
added. In addition, the provincial unemployment rate is included as a time-varying explanatory variable. 
The unobserved explanatory variables are assumed to be independent of the observed ones, time-
constant and destination-specific. We allow the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity to be 
arbitrarily correlated amongst each other and specify it as a discrete distribution with an a priori unknown 
number of points of support (Heckman and Singer 1984). Because there are six possible destinations 
(	, , , , , ), each point of support is a six-dimensional vector. Based on the recommendation of 
Gaure, Røed and Zhang (2007), we choose the number of points of support by minimizing the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Finally, treatments (PES, FPO or NPO) are allowed to affect the transition 
rates from unemployment to employment and out of the labour force as well as the transition rate from 
employment back to unemployment. In the most flexible specification, we interact these treatment indi-
cators with the linear index of the time-constant observed explanatory variables reported in Table 1 
(including the square of age). As we will explain in Section 5, these interactions aim at allowing for 
heterogeneous treatment effects as well as at testing for the presence of parking behaviour by the 
private providers. 
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Figure 2: Representation of the sequence of competing risks models 
 
Notes. U = unemployed without any treatment (); E = employed (	); OLF = out of the labour force (); PES
 
= unemployed and 
receiving in-house treatment of PES (); FPO = unemployed and receiving treatment of FPO (); NPO = unemployed and receiv-
ing treatment of NPO ().  
4.2 Identification 
Given that the timing of entry into the treatments is partially random, it is natural to base the identification 
of the treatment effects on the timing-of-events method (Abbring and Van den Berg 2003). However, 
some adjustments are introduced to allow for competing risks and for multiple treatments. 
First, the method requires that individuals cannot anticipate the start of the treatments. Since the PES 
did not make any publicity about the programme and because the target group is precisely the one that 
lacked contact with the PES in the preceding two years, it is unlikely that the unemployed would have 
known about it and even more unlikely that they could have anticipated the moment at which they would 
be contacted. They would have typically been informed about it for the first time by the invitation sent 
out a couple of weeks before the orientation stage or intake took place (at t0+T1). We do not have any 
information about the exact moment that this invitation has been dispatched, but assume that the period 
between dispatch and the start of the orientation stage (at t0+T1) was too short to have acted upon it. 
At the end of the intake or orientation phase the unemployed was informed that a provider would be 
assigned to her in order to determine an action plan and a treatment, but at that moment neither the 
exact date at which the provider was to be assigned (at t0+T1+T2), nor the identity of the provider was 
known. The start of the outsourced treatment coincided with the moment of provider assignment. It was 
impossible to determine whether the timing of this assignment was scheduled at intake or later on. In 
any case, on the basis of the observed assignment dates to external providers, the assignment took 
place very shortly after the intake meeting: more than 56% of the unemployed assigned to an external 
provider have started their treatment within a month after the starting point of the orientation stage, and 
90% within three months (Section 3.1).  
Different from Abbring and Van den Berg 2003 we allow that the exit rate from unemployment has two 
competing destinations: employment and out of the labour force. This does not invalidate the approach. 
Horny and Picchio (2010) and, more recently, Drepper and Effraimidis (2015) have shown that the 
treatment effect is identified without any exclusion restrictions from single spell competing risks data 
provided that the transition rates are of the Mixed Proportional (MPH) form.  
A distinguishing feature with the standard timing-of-events approach is that the treatment cannot start 
before the t0>21 first months of the unemployment spell, i.e. not before the labelling. The variation in t0 
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in the stock sample makes it possible to distinguish between the duration T1 between the labelling at t0 
and the start of the (first) treatment by the PES, and the unemployment duration Tu>t0.25 There is no 
reason why, conditional on the elapsed unemployment duration tu<Tu, the elapsed duration since label-
ling t1≤T1 would be related to the transition rates from unemployment to employment or out of the labour 
force apart from its effect through the treatment. We therefore exclude t1 from the set of determinants 
of these transition rates from unemployment, while we maintain it in the specification of the transition to 
the treatment. Even if the standard timing-of-events approach does not require it, this exclusion re-
striction clearly provides an additional source to disentangle the treatment effect from selection on un-
observables. 
A second distinguishing feature is that we consider the effect of multiple treatments. Nevertheless, the 
identification problem is simplified, because (i) the outsourcing to external providers began only for the 
cohorts labelled after November 2005, and (ii) since then the treatment choice is partly sequential: All 
treatments by private providers, be it by FPO or by NPO, are preceded by an in-house treatment by the 
PES starting at t0+T1. The in-house by the PES can be analysed as in the standard framework apart 
from the fact that, as discussed, the assignment to the treatment cannot occur before 21 months. If we 
assume that the unobserved composition of the curative target population is stable over time,26 the 
analysis of the cohorts labelled before December 2005 allow to separately identify the selection on 
unobservables into treatment by the public provider from that by external providers. From 2006 on-
wards, treatments by external private provider may substitute the in-house treatment. Because the tim-
ing of entry in this treatment, t0+T1+T2, is, as already mentioned, neither predetermined, nor anticipated, 
this random timing can be exploited to separately identify the causal effect of treatment by these exter-
nal providers. Moreover, also in this situation we have additional exclusion restrictions that aid in iden-
tifying the treatment effects: (i) there is no reason why the elapsed durations t1<T1 and t2<T2 would be 
related to the transition rates from unemployment apart from their effect through the treatments; (ii) in 
some districts the unemployed can only be assigned to one type of external provider, either NPO or 
FPO (Section 3.3 and Table A.1 in Appendix A.1), which is helpful for separating out the treatment 
effect of each private provider from the other. 
4.3 Accounting for the Sampling at Labelling 
The data for analysis are informative on the entry date in unemployment, but the sampling occurred at 
labelling. Consequently, in the sample of analysis, all individuals have been unemployed for at least 21 
months, and no information is available on the transition rates during the first 21 months. Hence, in the 
analysis we shift the origin of the unemployment spell by 21 months. Given this new origin, we consider 
that individuals may only be sampled (= labelled) beyond the shifted origin: t0-21>0. For this, we follow 
the conventional approach for stock samples (Lancaster, 1979; Nickel 1979; Ridder 1984). We form 
our log-likelihood function by explicitly conditioning on the elapsed duration t0-21 (instead of on t0). 
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 If individuals would have been labelled at a fixed unemployment duration, then T1 and Tu would have differed only by a fixed 
constant. 
26
 By conditioning the hazard rate on the age and the provincial unemployment rate at entry in unemployment, we allow for 
unobserved compositional changes that are proportional to these variables. 
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5. RESULTS 
We report the key findings of three estimated models: (i) the model accounting for selection on observ-
ables only; (ii) the model accounting for selection on both observables and unobservables; (iii) the 
model corresponding to (ii) apart from additionally included interactions for the exit destinations employ-
ment (	) and out of the labour force () of the treatment indicators with a linear index of the observed 
individual characteristics listed in Table 1.27 According to the AIC, the multivariate distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity can be described by 11x6 points of support. Some of these points of support 
approach minus infinity, which means that the exit rate to that specific destination approaches zero, i.e., 
the distribution is defective. In these cases, the points of support of these destinations are not estimated, 
but fixed to a very large negative value. For transitions following destinations that cannot be attained, 
we fix the points of support arbitrarily to zero. For instance, if the point of support of the transition to 
employment is set to minus infinity, the corresponding point of the transition from employment back to 
unemployment is set to zero.  
We focus the discussion on the parameters of interest: the proportional effect of the treatment on the 
transition rate to employment (	), on the transition out of the labour force () and for those who found a 
job, on the transition back to unemployment (). For each of these effects, we consider first the impact 
of being treated by the PES relative to no treatment and then, the impact of treatment by FPOs and 
NPOs relative to treatment by the PES. The interested reader can find the complete estimation results 
in Appendix A.4. To obtain some goodness-of-fit measures and to facilitate the interpretation of these 
treatment effects, we also perform some (counterfactual) simulations that we report in Section 5.2.  
Table 3: The Proportional Effects of Provider Types on the Transition Intensities 
Proportional Effect  
on Hazard 
A. Transition from U to E B. Transition from U to OLF C. Transition from E to U 
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
Treatment PES (ref.) 0.809*** 1.717*** 1.701*** 0.336*** 1.678*** 1.880*** 0.180*** 0.243*** 0.240*** (0.041) (0.068) (0.088) (0.038) (0.067) (0.111) (0.039) (0.078) (0.071) 
Interaction with  
linear index 
- - -0.458*** - - -0.633*** - - - 
  (0.074)   (0.046)    
Treatment FPO 
0.410*** 0.228** 0.250** -0.058 0.314** 0.214* 0.023 -0.043 -0.073 
(0.065) (0.116) (0.103) (0.082) (0.130) (0.123) (0.059) (0.111) (0.083) 
Interaction with  
linear index 
- - -0.221* - - -0.078 - - - 
  (0.125)   (0.118)    
Treatment NPO 
0.311*** 0.028 0.118 -0.083 0.157 0.111 0.128 0.061 0.037 
(0.082) (0.119) (0.126) (0.096) (0.138) (0.140) (0.084) (0.119) (0.093) 
Interaction with  
linear index 
- - -0.314* - - -0.132 - - - 
  (0.171)   (0.143)    
Notes. Model (i): Accounting for selection on observables; Model (ii): Accounting for selection on both, observables and unob-
servables; Model (iii): As model (ii), but treatment indicators interacted with a linear index of observed individual characteristics 
listed in Table 1 (no interaction for transition from E to U). The proportional effects of treatment by FPO and NPO are relative to 
those by the PES. For model (iii) the treatment effects are evaluated at the sample average for the corresponding provider. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
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 We also tried these interaction in the transition back to unemployment (), but because these were not statistically significantly 
different from zero, we do not report this model. 
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5.1 The Impact of the Treatments on the Transition Rates 
The overall effect of the programme 
Table 3 reports for the three aforementioned models, the estimated proportional effects of the different 
provider types on the hazard to employment, out of the labour force and from employment back to 
unemployment. Let us first consider the overall effect of programme participation, irrespective of the 
provider type. For all three models, participation results in notably statistically significant higher exit 
rates (1) to employment, (2) out of the labour force and (3) back to unemployment for those who found 
a job.  
The proportional treatment effects are very large. For instance, if we consider model (iii), the point 
estimate implies that an in-house treatment by the PES enhances the transition rate to employment by 
a factor exp(1.701)=5.5 compared to the counterfactual of no participation. For those who are treated 
by FPOs (NPOs) this factor is even exp(1.701+0.250)=7.0 (exp(1.701+0.118)=6.2). This can be ex-
plained as follows. First, the target population is very long-term unemployed. At the start of the treat-
ment, i.e. the beginning of the orientation phase, median elapsed unemployment duration is 54.1 
months (Table 2). For such long-term unemployed who have, moreover, not been in contact with the 
PES for at least two years, the transition rate to employment is extremely low. We can derive from our 
simulations (Section 5.2) that in the counterfactual of no treatment the median of this transition rate is 
in the first year after the start of the treatment as low as 0.40%/month on average. Second, as men-
tioned, the model estimates show that some points of support of the heterogeneity distribution converge 
to minus infinity and, hence, the corresponding transition rates for these individuals approach zero. By 
the assumption that the treatment affects transition rates proportionally, the effect of the treatment is 
zero for these individuals. Since at the start of the treatment the fraction of individuals with zero transi-
tion rates is estimated to be about 34%, the proportional treatment effect applies only to the remaining 
66% (see Table 4 below). Therefore, the transition rate in the counterfactual of treatment is roughly 
0.40%/month x (0.34 + 5.5 x 0.66) = 1.59%/month. The point estimate suggests therefore that the treat-
ment by the PES increases the transition rate from unemployment to employment by about 1.2 percent-
age points (pp) per month.  
This effect is important, but not unrealistic, since one has to consider that we do not only measure the 
impact of programme participation per se, but also of its mandatory nature. The threat of a sanction in 
case of non-participation to the programme (Black, Smith, Berger and Noel 2003; Geerdsen 2006; 
Geerdsen and Holm 2007; Rosholm and Svarer 2008; Van den Berg, Bergemann and Caliendo 2009) 
or the sanction itself (van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and van Ours 2004; Abbring, van den Berg and 
van Ours 2005; Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller 2005; Svarer 2011; van der Klaauw and van Ours 
2013) can have a major impact on the transition rate to employment. The combined effect may hence 
be substantial (Meyer 1995; Dolton and O’Neil 1996; 2002; Graversen and van Ours 2008). Moreover, 
in a recent meta-analysis Card, Kluve and Weber (2015) show that job search assistance and sanction 
programmes appear to be relatively more successful for disadvantaged participants, such as the target 
group of the programme that is evaluated in this research.    
A similar reasoning with respect to the size of the treatment effects applies for the transition out of the 
labour force. Because in the counterfactual of no treatment the transition rate out of the labour force is 
about 0.34%/month, the transition rate in the counterfactual of treatment by the PES is approximately 
0.34%/month x (0.34 + exp(1.880) x 0.66) = 1.59%/month and, therefore, the treatment effect is roughly 
1.25 pp/month. The finding that the programme enhances the transition out of the labour force is con-
sistent with its mandatory nature. Petrongolo (2009) and Manning (2009) show that imposing stricter 
requirements on unemployed benefit recipients can indeed induce them to stop claiming benefits and 
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leave the labour force.  
For the transition from employment back to unemployment, there are no individuals with a zero treat-
ment effect, because conditional on having made a transition to employment, no point of support of this 
transition approaches minus infinity. Hence, given a transition rate of 2.2%/month in the counterfactual 
of no treatment, the treatment enhances this rate to 2.2%/month x exp(0.240) = 2.8%/month, an in-
crease of 0.6 pp/month. A higher exit rate from employment is in line with the explanation that manda-
tory programme participation lowers the quality of the job match (Petrongolo 2009; Arni, Lalive and Van 
Ours 2013; van den Berg and Vikström 2014). Together with the finding that programme participation 
speeds up the transition to employment, this result means that the programme involves a trade-off. In 
Section 5.2, we propose a quantification of this trade-off based on counterfactual simulations. 
The relative effectiveness and efficiency of the different provider types 
The focus of this study is on measuring the relative effectiveness of the three different provider types. 
Based on model (iii), we conclude that the FPOs are more effective than the PES in enhancing the 
transition rate from unemployment to employment: it is 28% (= (exp(0.25)-1)*100) higher than the in-
house treatment by the PES. The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, in com-
parison to the treatment effect of the PES, this additional effect is relatively small, more so, if one takes 
into account that among those assigned to an external provider the fraction never exiting unemployment 
rises to 49% (Table 4). This means that the effective multiplier falls from 1.28 to (0.49 + 0.51 x 1.28) = 
1.14.  
The point estimate of the effect of the NPOs lies between that of the PES and the FPOs, but neither 
difference is statistically significant. Similar point estimates of the effects on the withdrawal rate from 
the labour force are found, although the differential effect between that of the FPOs and the PES is 
slightly lower and only significantly different at the 10% level. This suggests that the private providers 
may have been more likely than the PES to report non-cooperative behaviour to the federal UI agency 
which could have led to sanctions and, hence, withdrawals from the labour force. Unfortunately, our 
data do not allow to test this hypothesis, since they do not contain any information about these sanc-
tions.  
Finally, the provider type does not have any significantly different effect on job quality as measured by 
the transition rate from employment back to unemployment, although the point estimates suggest that 
treatment by FPOs lengthens the employment spell slightly relative to the in-house treatment, while 
treatment by NPOs shortens this spell slightly. 
So, in contrast to the existing evidence, we find that private providers, and FPOs in particular, can be 
more effective than the public provider in bringing long-term unemployed job seekers back to work, be 
it at a cost of a slightly higher withdrawal rate from the labour force. FPOs also provide the treatment at 
a significantly lower cost (on average 5.4% cheaper than the PES; see Section 2.3). This means that 
FPOs provide overall more value for money. In contrast, NPOs were on average 7.6% more expensive 
than the PES and their impact on employment was not significantly higher than that of the PES. To-
gether with the observation that the enhancement of the impact of both private providers was small 
relative to that of the PES, our findings do actually not diverge much from recent studies that did not 
find any significant differences between provider types (Bennmarker, Grönqvist and Öckert 2013; Laun 
and Skogman Thoursie 2014; Krug and Stephan 2013; Rehwald, Rosholm and Svarer 2015).  
A comparison between the results of model (iii) and those of model (ii) indicates that controlling for 
selection on unobservables matters. In particular, in the absence of such a control, the treatment effect 
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of the in-house services on both exit destinations is dramatically underestimated, while for the out-
sourced ones, the exit to employment is overestimated and the exit from the labour force underesti-
mated. The latter biases are more important for the FPOs than for the NPOs. The effect on the return 
from employment to unemployment is not as strongly affected by this selection on unobservables. When 
we in addition allow for heterogeneity in the treatment effect (model (iii)), there is no major change in 
these findings, except that the difference between the treatment effect of FPOs and NPOs diminishes.  
Explaining the differential performance of the different provider types 
Overall, we find that FPOs are more efficient than the other providers in bringing the programme par-
ticipants back to work. Relative to the public in-house treatment they are both more effective and 
cheaper;28 relative to the NPOs better performance is essentially a matter of lower costs. In this section 
we discuss some factors that may drive this differential performance, and, hence, calls for further re-
search to determine to what extent these factors are intrinsically linked to the provider type (profit, non-
profit or public) or, rather, are factors that may confound the causal relationship, or make it dependent 
on the some features of the programme that was studied, such as the particular form of the incentive 
contract, or the fact that it was the first public procurement of employment services in a series.29  
In the Introduction, we mentioned that economic theory predicts that private for-profit providers have 
incentives to overinvest in cost saving technologies, leading to low value added (Hart, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). However, in the case of a pro-social mission, such as the provision of services to the 
long-term unemployed considered here, there is an intrinsic motivation to deliver high quality.30 Most of 
the existing literature argues that the presence of a profit motive would crowd out such a pro-social 
motivation, suggesting thereby that NPOs would outperform FPOs in the delivery of such services (e.g., 
Frey 1997; Kreps 1997; Frey and Jegen 2001; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 
2012). Nevertheless, recent research (Ashraf, Bandiera and Kelsey 2014; Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee 
2015) finds that material incentives (i) need not crowd out intrinsic motivation and (ii) may attract agents 
valuing more material benefits without necessarily displacing pro-social preferences. This research 
finds evidence that in case of a pro-social mission, utilizing material incentives can in fact (i) motivate 
agents to perform better and (ii) attract talented agents who also perform well in the non-incentivised 
dimension. Our finding that FPOs are more efficient relative to the non-profit public or private providers 
in bringing the long-term unemployed back to work is consistent with these recent findings.  
A second potential explanation of the better performance of the FPOs is that, in contrast to the NPOs, 
the FPOs were new in the market and hence, had more incentives to build up a good reputation because 
the procurement of these employment services were announced to be the first of a series. In addition, 
as FPOs were larger than NPOs, they could have benefited from economies of scale relative to NPOs. 
Finally, the FPOs employed a cheaper counselling technology by privileging group to individual coun-
selling (Section 3.3), which apparently did not negatively affect the quality of the service provision. 
These elements may have more than compensated for the lack of experience of FPOs relative to NPOs 
in the Flemish market of employment services (Section 2.3). This lack of experience and incomplete 
mastery of the counselling technology was a major explanation for the lower performance of the private 
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 Because, as mentioned in Section 2.3, the cost of provision by the PES was based on an estimation, we cannot claim with 
certainty that the FPOs were cheaper than the PES. However, this statement is robust as long as the true cost is not more than 
11% below the reference price. 
29
 Note that these doubts on causal interpretation apply equally to the existing studies that compare public to private provision. 
30
 We assume that delivery of high quality means that services enhance the employment of participants as much as possible. 
However, alternatively, prosocial behaviour could mean that counsellors rather aim at improving the “quality of life” of the disad-
vantaged group. With the available data, we cannot test this hypothesis. However, arguably, the delivered counselling and em-
ployment services should in priority aim at increasing the employability of participants.         
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service providers in France (Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand 2014). 
Another potential explanation of the differential performance of the private providers relative to the pub-
lic providers is related to selection and contract incentives. First, as mentioned above, the private pro-
viders could not select clients because they were not allowed to refuse trainees proposed by the PES. 
Nevertheless, in the descriptive analysis in Section 3.3, we already have documented that based on 
observed characteristics, the clients of FPOs appeared to be more employable than those of NPOs, 
who in turn were more employable than those of the PES. By comparing the treatment effects of models 
(i) and (ii), we can deduce that the clients of the private providers are, relative to those of the PES, also 
a positive selection in terms of unobserved employability. In contrast to the selection on observables, 
NPOs have a more positively selected clientele in terms of unobservables than FPOs: The treatment 
effect for the transition to employment decreases more between model (ii) and (i) than the one for the 
FPOs. For the transition out of the labour force, the trainees of the private providers are, however, 
negatively selected in terms of unobservables, and more so for the FPOs. To conclude, even if the 
providers could not influence the selection process, the composition of their clientele clearly differed. 
Because the payment scheme did not take this differential composition into account, this must have 
induced rewards to be unrelated to effective performance of the providers. This contrasts to the findings 
of Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand (2014), who did not find significant differential selection between the 
private and public providers in France.  
Because the payment for the service delivery was for 70% fixed, the private providers had an incentive 
to “park” their clients, i.e., to just offer a minimum of services (Section 2.3). Nevertheless, the fact that 
the remaining 30% of the payment is conditional on exit from unemployment provides some incentives 
to the private providers to concentrate service delivery on those with the lowest chances of exit and to 
rely on those with the highest chances to leave unemployment without any intervention. Model (iii) aims 
at testing this hypothesis. The linear indices interacting the treatment indicators are measures of the 
individual propensity to exit to work or out of the labour force.31 The hypothesis that private providers 
act upon the contract incentives is, therefore, not rejected if the coefficient of this interaction, in deviation 
from that of the PES, is negative. We indeed cannot reject this hypothesis for the transition to employ-
ment, at the 7.7% level for FPOs and at the 6.7% level for NPOs. This finding is in agreement with that 
of Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand (2014) who also find evidence that private providers in France park 
more clients than the public provider. However, concentrating resources on the least employable un-
employed may for the programme that we evaluate actually have enhanced the effectiveness because 
the intervention also works better for this group: The interactions of the linear index with the treatment 
indicators of the PES (i.e., the reference) are indeed negative and highly statistically significant (see 
Table 3). Moreover, since FPOs had, in terms of observables, the most employable clients and the 
NPOs the least employable, this means that the differential composition actually favoured the NPOs 
and disadvantaged the FPOs. Despite this, FPOs performed best.    
Behaghel, Crépon and Gurgand (2014) found that French job seekers enrolled in the private programme 
were less likely to be sanctioned than those enrolled in the public programme. A possible interpretation 
was that, in contrast to caseworkers in the public programme, caseworkers in the private programme 
did not apply sanctions because they neither had the incentives nor the terms of reference to do so. In 
this study, we are not capable of distinguishing between exits from the labour force and sanctions, but 
we do find some weak evidence that private providers, especially FPOs, enhance withdrawals (com-
prising sanctions) relative to the PES. This is probably related to the explicit instruction of private pro-
viders to report (as in-house caseworkers) non-cooperative behaviour of clients. This information is then 
transmitted to the federal UI, which decides whether sanctions are imposed. A second reason is that 
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 In principle, we could allow the treatment effect depend on unobservables (Richardson and van den Berg 2013). However, 
because model complexity makes estimation already extremely time-consuming, we did not consider this complication. 
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the incentive contract provides monetary rewards irrespectively of whether unemployment is left for a 
job or for inactivity. 
5.2 Counterfactual Analysis Based on Simulations 
By simulating model (iii) 999 times, we aim at evaluating the goodness-of-fit of our model and at facili-
tating the interpretation of our counterfactual evaluations. To allow for the precision of the estimators, 
we draw each time an entire new vector of parameters assuming that these are normally distributed 
around the point estimates with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one. Appendix A.3 
provides details on the simulation method, while Appendix A.5 reports the goodness-of-fit statistics. The 
goodness-of-fit statistics consist in the realised cumulative fractions of individuals leaving to each of the 
six destinations together with the corresponding simulated 95% Confidence Intervals (CI). These sta-
tistics are reported from the start of the orientation phase for the duration until treatment by a private 
provider, from the fourth month after entry in employment in the case of a return back to unemployment, 
because by definition, exit from unemployment requires this exit to last a minimum of three months, and 
from labelling in all other cases, until a maximum of 72 months later. For all destinations, the realised 
fractions are for most elapsed durations contained in the 95% CI. The major exception is that the fraction 
leaving the labour force is slightly overestimated during the first six months since labelling. If we con-
sider the 99% CI (not reported), this overestimation is only present during the first two months. 
Table 4: Simulated Effects of the Overall Programme and of the Provider Type32 
Outcome 
Overall FPO relative to PES FPO relative to NPO 
Median [95% CI] Median [95% CI] Median [95% CI] 
A. Fraction exiting U after 12 months 0.216 [0.205, 0.226] 0.039 [0.015, 0.063] 0.018 [-0.014, 0.049] 
To E 0.110 [0.102, 0.119] 0.028 [0.006, 0.051] 0.015 [-0.011, 0.042] 
To OLF 0.106 [0.097, 0.114] 0.011 [-0.006, 0.029] 0.003 [-0.019, 0.025] 
B. U duration (unconditional) -19.7 [-32.0, -10.7] 0.0 [-0.1, 0.0] 0.0 [-0.0, 0.0] 
Fraction ever exiting U† 0.66 [0.61, 0.72] 0.49 [0.45, 0.54] 0.49 [0.45, 0.54] 
U duration (if ever exits U) -69.2 [-87.7, -57.5] -1.7 [-3.3, 0.3] -0.6 [-2.4, 0.4] 
    U duration if exit to E (UD) -39.5 [-45.4, -34.1] -1.6 [-3.3, -0.2] -0.8 [-2.5, 0.3] 
    E duration if exit to E (ED) -5.2 [-9.7, -1.6] 1.4 [-1.2, 4.4] 2.0 [-0.9, 5.3] 
    ED/(UD+ED) if exit to E 0.29 [0.26, 0.32] 0.04 [0.01, 0.08] 0.03 [-0.0, 0.07] 
Notes: † This fraction is equal to one minus the estimated proportion of individuals for whom the mass points of the distribution 
of unobserved heterogeneity for exits to employment and out of the labour force approach minus infinity at the start of the 
treatment. “Overall”: In this column the effects of the intervention, irrespectively of the treatment provider type (PES, FPO and 
NPO), are measured for all 10,821 individuals who enter the orientation stage/intake from that moment onwards. The table 
reports the median differences between the simulated outcomes in case of treatment and of the counterfactual of no treatment. 
“FPO relative to PES (NPO)”: In this column the effects of an intervention by a FPO is measured for all 1,167 individuals who 
are assigned to an FPO from that moment onwards. The table reports the median differences between the simulated outcomes 
in case of treatment by an FPO and the counterfactual of continued treatment by the PES (NPO). “UD”: This measures the 
unemployment duration (UD) for treated individuals who found a job. In the counterfactual treatment exit to employment is forced 
by imposing in the simulation that no labour force exit can occur. “ED”: This measures, for individuals who found a job, the 
duration until the individual returns to unemployment. If one assumes that the employment spell is never interrupted by an exit 
from the labour force, this is the employment duration (ED). “ED/(UD+ED)”: This measures, for those individuals who found a 
job, the fraction of time that they have been employed since the start of the treatment until the return to unemployment. If 
treatment affects UD and ED in the same direction, then this ratio allows determining which of the two effects dominates. 
Treatment effects are in bold if they are statistically significantly different from zero (at the 5% level). 95% CI between brackets. 
In Table 3, we reported the effects of the overall programme and of the provider types on the different 
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 The simulated effects of the NPO relative to the PES and to the FPO can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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transition rates. To facilitate the interpretation, we provide some complementary statistics of these treat-
ment effects that are based on counterfactual simulations of the estimated model. The simulations gen-
erate for each treated individual from the orientation stage/intake the following outcomes, once in case 
of treatment and once in the counterfactual of no treatment: the unemployment duration, in case of exit, 
its destination, and in case of exit to employment, the employment duration (see Appendix A.3 for tech-
nical details). In Table 4, we report a selection of median treatment effects on the aforementioned out-
comes. We report the median treatment effects33 rather than the average treatment effects because 
these are less sensitive to individuals with extremely long predicted durations present in our data.  
The overall effect of the programme 
An unemployed job seeker selected at the start of the orientation stage/intake is after one year 21.6 
percentage points (pp) more likely to have left unemployment than in the counterfactual of no treatment: 
30.4% in case of treatment and 8.8% in the counterfactual of no treatment (not reported in Table 4). 
Exit to employment and out of the labour force is about equally likely enhanced: an increase of 11.0 pp 
to the former and 10.6 pp to the latter destination. Irrespective of the treatment status, in the limit, at 
most 66% of these job seekers ever leave unemployment because for 34% of this population, the mass 
point approaches minus infinity (panel B of Table 4). Consequently, between two and three years after 
the start of the treatment (not reported in Table 4), the median treatment effect on the fraction that 
leaves unemployment attains a maximum of about 25 pp and then subsequently starts to decrease. It 
will eventually approach zero, because eventually those surviving never leave unemployment. 
Programme participation reduces the unemployment duration by nearly 20 months. If we condition on 
participants who leave unemployment at some point, this effect is even as large as 69 months.34 These 
are very large effects. As already mentioned in Section 5.1, this is because the target group of very 
long-term unemployed has extremely low chances to leave unemployment. The median (not reported 
in Table 4) of the (un)conditional duration distribution in the counterfactual of treatment and no treatment 
is extrapolated to be, respectively, 14 (154) months and 85 (722) months. Expressing the treatment 
effect in terms of unemployment duration underlines that a programme that targets at individuals who 
are very unlikely to leave unemployment in the counterfactual of no participation can generate substan-
tial savings in terms of UB payments, even if the effect as measured in terms of pp on the probability of 
leaving is relatively modest.   
For treated job seekers who have found a job (and impose that a job is found in the counterfactual of 
no treatment), unemployment duration falls by 39.5 months and employment duration by 5.2 months. 
This demonstrates that treatment induces a trade-off between accelerating the job finding rate and the 
rate of return to unemployment. In order to quantify which effect dominates, we simulated for those 
individuals who found a job after treatment the fraction of time that they are employed between the start 
of the treatment and their eventual re-entry in unemployment for both treatment counterfactuals. The 
median difference of those counterfactual is reported in the last line of Table 4. The treatment effect on 
unemployment duration clearly dominates that on employment duration: the fraction of time in employ-
ment increases by 29 pp. In the absence of treatment the median fraction of time in employment of this 
sub-sample was 37 pp (not reported in Table 4).  
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 The “median treatment effect” is not the same as the difference between the medians in the counterfactual of treatment and 
no treatment. Whenever we refer to a “treatment effect” in the sequel, we mean the “median treatment effect”. 
34
 Note that the impacts on these conditional duration distributions reflect the estimated treatment effects reported in Table 3. 
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The effect of treatment by FPOs relative to treatment by the PES or by NPOs 
In Table 4, we also report the median treatment effects for the job seekers who have been counselled 
or trained by an FPO from the moment of assignment to this provider. In the simulation, we consider 
two counterfactuals from this moment onwards: treatment by the PES (column 3) or treatment by NPOs 
(column 4). One year after being assigned to an FPO, an unemployed job seeker is 3.9 pp (1.8 pp) 
more likely to have left unemployment than in the counterfactual of treatment by the PES (an NPO). 
Only the effect relative to that of the PES is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
This significant effect is for more than two thirds (2.8 pp) to employment. Exits from the labour force 
increase by 1.1 pp, but not statistically significantly. Relative to NPOs, virtually all the increase in the 
exit rate is to employment, but neither effect is significant at the 5% level. 
More than half of the individuals treated by FPOs never leave unemployment.35 This explains why the 
unconditional median effect of treatment by an FPO is zero: The fraction never leaving unemployment 
is not affected by programme participation. This means that FPOs only succeed in affecting the unem-
ployment duration of 49% of their clients and that, only for those who found a job the unemployment 
spell is statistically significantly shorter (1.6 months) than in in the counterfactual treatment by the PES. 
The employment spell is 1.4 months, but statistically insignificantly longer. Together this implies that 
overall the fraction of time in employment increases significantly by 4 pp.  
The FPOs are also slightly more effective than NPOs in reducing the unemployment duration of those 
clients who found a job and in increasing the length of their employment spell. The combined effect 
raises the fraction of time spent in employment by 3 pp, close to significantly at the 5% level. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has evaluated the contracting out of part of a public mandatory counselling and training 
programme for long-term unemployed in Flanders (Belgium) to private for-profit and non-profit organi-
sations (FPO and NPO). The programme aimed at providing employment services to unemployment 
benefit recipients who were at least 21 months unemployed (15, if younger than 25) and to whom the 
regional Public Employment Services (PES) did not offer any counselling pathway or training in the 
preceding two years. Participation in the programme was mandatory.  
In 2005, the PES launched a first call for tenders to procure these services to the private sector. This 
call aimed at increasing capacity and at enhancing the efficiency in the delivery of these employment 
services. In this way, 6,000 counselling and training pathways were contracted out to private providers, 
FPOs and NPOs, between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009. Based on a sample of 1,981 of 
these pathways assigned to the private sector (1,167 to FPOs and 814 to NPOs), 8,840 pathways 
provided in-house by the PES and 5,336 unemployment spells that ended before the treatment started, 
we evaluated the effectiveness of the overall programme as well as the relative effectiveness of the 
programme between the three providers. 
At the start of the treatment median elapsed unemployment durations was as high as 46.5 months. This 
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 For the clients of NPOs, the fraction leaving unemployment is 51%, and the 95% CI is [46%, 57%]. 
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very disadvantaged target group hardly left unemployment in the counterfactual of no treatment: One 
year later 91.2% would still have been unemployed. One year after the start of programme participation 
(unconditional on the provider type) the exit rate of these individuals was raised by 21.6 percentage 
points (pp). About half of the enhanced exits from unemployment were withdrawals from the labour 
force, presumably36 induced by a (threat of) a sanction in case of noncompliance. Qualitatively, this 
effect is in line with the existing literature, but the size of the effect seems higher than that found in other 
studies. We believe that the large magnitude is related to the fact that we measure the combined effect 
of programme participation and the impact induced by its mandatory nature. We argued that it may be 
also related to the fact that the target group was particularly disadvantaged. For, in recent meta-analysis 
Card, Kluve and Weber (2015) show that job search assistance and sanction programmes appear to 
be relatively more successful for disadvantaged participants.   
We also find that the programme overall speeds up, for those who found a job, the return back to 
unemployment by 5 months. However, the effect on unemployment duration dominates this effect. Rel-
ative to the counterfactual of no treatment, the programme increased the share of time spent in employ-
ment during the first unemployment-work cycle by 29 percentage points (pp).  
In contrast to the existing literature, which finds either no significant differential effect of private providers 
or a negative impact on the job finding rate, our analysis does find that relative to the PES, FPOs are 
more effective in bringing the unemployed back to work, but the improvement is relatively small. One 
year after assignment to FPOs the job finding rate of unemployed significantly increases by 2.8 pp. In 
addition, for those who found a job, the rate of return to unemployment is postponed by 1.4 months. 
This significantly increases the share of time spent in employment during the first unemployment-work 
cycle by 4 pp. Treatment by FPOs also slightly increases withdrawals from the labour force, but this 
effect is not significant at the 5% level. By contrast, in line with the existing evidence on private providers 
in general, NPOs do not perform significantly better (or worse) than the PES.  
FPOs are also found to outperform NPOs slightly, but this differential effect is never statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level. The job finding rate increases by 1.5 pp, and the return to employment is delayed 
by 2.0 months. Together, this increases the share of time spent in employment by 3 pp and this effect 
is only marginally above the threshold of 5% statistical significance. There is no difference in the with-
drawal rate from the labour force between FPOs and NPOs. 
Even if these differential effects are not large, they matter if one considers that the average ex-post 
(taking the performance payment into account) unit price of a counselling or training pathway of an FPO  
was 14.4% and 11.2% lower than, respectively, that of an NPO or of the reference price of the PES. 
NPOs could actually charge a higher price than FPOs because they were exempted from the 21% VAT 
while the FPOs were not. We advanced a number of explanations why the FPOs could be more efficient 
than the non-profit (private or public) providers. First, these results are in line with recent research 
(Ashraf, Bandiera and Kelsey 2014; Ashraf, Bandiera and Lee 2015), which finds that in case of a pro-
social mission (such as the provision of employment services to the long-term unemployed), employing 
material incentives could, in fact, (i) motivate agents to perform better and (ii) attract talented agents 
who also perform well in the non-incentivised dimension. This means that the profit motive need not 
crowd out pro-social motivation. Second, in contrast to the NPOs, the FPOs were new in the market 
and hence had more incentives to build a good reputation. Third, because the FPOs were larger than 
the NPOs, they could have benefited from economies of scale. Fourth, the FPOs systematically made 
use of a cheaper counselling technology than did NPOs, which privileged group to individual meetings 
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 With the available data it was not possible to identify the degree of noncompliance and extent to which sanctions were im-
posed.  
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and which was apparently more cost effective in the quality dimensions of the service provision that we 
measured in this study. Further research is required to determine whether these factors are intrinsically 
linked to the provider type (profit, non-profit or public) or, rather, are factors that may confound the 
causal relationship.  
In spite of the low powered payment scheme (70% of the unit price was fixed), we found some evidence 
of opportunistic behaviour of the private providers (both FPOs and NPOs) in that they appeared to have 
maximised the performance pay by concentrating the treatment on the least employable clients and to 
park the most employable clients. However, this opportunistic behaviour has reinforced the effective-
ness of the private providers rather than reducing it, because the treatment was found to be most ef-
fective for the least employable group. 
The finding that the payment scheme has reinforced effectiveness may, however, be a coincidence. 
One of the primary difficulties in the designing of performance payment schemes is finding a good 
measure of performance on which to base the payment. For the provision of employment services 
payment schemes based on relative performance may work better than on absolute performance to the 
extent that the composition of the clientele and the state of the labour market does not differ between 
providers. This could be realised by randomly assigning the clientele to different providers in the same 
region and then, basing the payment on the relative performance of these providers within a region. 
This is an avenue for further research. 
This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to show that the contracting out of employment 
services can improve the performance of the PES and, in particular, that FPOs can perform – be it 
moderately – better than both the PES and NPOs, even if the quality of the service provision is difficult 
to measure. Nevertheless, in this comparison we did not take into account the organisational cost of 
the public tender. These amount about 14% of the expenditures made to the external providers (De-
visscher et al. 2009, p.232) and, hence, eliminate roughly the cost advantage of the FPOs relative to 
the estimated costs of in-house provision. This clarifies that large efficiency gains cannot be made by 
the contracting-out of employment services. 
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A. APPENDIX 
A.1 Additional Summary Statistics  
Table A. 1: PES Office in the district in which the Unemployed is Registered at Labelling  
Treatment Status: All Untreated FPO NPO Public 
District Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Antwerp 0.235 0.259 0.311 0.090 0.224 
Mechelen 0.056 0.050 0.045 0.108 0.056 
Turnhout 0.068 0.068 0.040 0.087 0.070 
Leuven 0.046 0.050 0.076 0.007 0.043 
Vilvoorde 0.050 0.055 0.043 0.020 0.051 
Brugge 0.021 0.018 0.000 0.042 0.024 
Kortrijk-Roeselare 0.042 0.037 0.000 0.134 0.042 
Oostende-Ieper 0.038 0.031 0.000 0.124 0.039 
Aalst-Oudenaarde 0.051 0.036 0.037 0.070 0.061 
Gent 0.155 0.155 0.267 0.000 0.155 
St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 0.046 0.039 0.031 0.054 0.051 
Hasselt 0.151 0.168 0.125 0.219 0.139 
Tongeren 0.040 0.035 0.024 0.045 0.045 
Number of individuals 16,157 5,336 1,167 814 8,840 
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics of Observed Individual Characteristics and of Features of the 
Treatment. All Unemployed Labelled in Curative Group Between March 2005 and March 2007 
and Older than 2537 
Treatment Status: All Untreated FPO NPO PES 
A. Individual characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Woman 0.568 0.584 0.523 0.573 0.566 
Migrant background 0.169 0.157 0.169 0.116 0.182 
Disabled 0.249 0.167 0.068 0.138 0.335 
Driver's licence 0.669 0.687 0.710 0.716 0.647 
Proficient in Dutch 0.754 0.779 0.842 0.818 0.719 
Number of languages in which proficient 1.444 1.520 1.708 1.413 1.362 
Education 
         
    primary/lower secondary (< grade 10) 0.316 0.300 0.266 0.303 0.335 
    secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12) 0.286 0.287 0.278 0.312 0.285 
    secondary (≥ grade 12) 0.288 0.303 0.308 0.283 0.277 
    tertiary (bachelor or master) 0.109 0.110 0.148 0.102 0.104 
Age at labelling (years) 39.6 38.5 40.2 41.8 39.9 
B. Features of the treatment Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Treatment beyond the orientation stage   
    Training included in pathway* - - 0.497 0.412 0.445 
    Only counselling* - - 0.503 0.588 0.555 
Type of counselling 
    
    Individual - - 0.373 0.635 NA 
    in group - - 0.542 0.000 NA 
    individual and in group - - 0.085 0.365 NA 
Number of individuals: 31,938 9,806 2,784 1,826 17,522 
Notes: * Calculated on the basis of non-missing information. For the external providers this information is missing for only 3% of 
the participants. However, for the in-house provision by the PES this information was lacking for 38% of the participants, and is, 
hence, less reliable. NA = Not available 
A.2 Econometric Model 
Figure 2 illustrates how the transition process can be described by a series of (latent) durations Tjd 
associated the origin states j and to the competing destination states d. In unemployment we distinguish 
between three stages: (i) 	 ∈ 	, , 	if the treatment has not yet started; (ii) 	 ∈ 	, , ,  
in case of treatment by the PES (); (iii) either 	 ∈ 	,  or 	 ∈ 	, 	after outsourcing, depend-
ing on whether the treatment is outsourced to an FPO () or NPO (). In case of a transition to another 
treatment status ( ∈ , , ) the duration clock of unemployment is not halted and the duration in the 
first two stages is measured, respectively, by ̃ +  ≡ ̃ + 	where	̃ ≡  − 21,38 and " ≡
min	& , '.39 By contrast, in case of a transition to (	,  the unemployment spell ends: ) ≡
min*+, , +-. (for  ∈ , , , ). If unemployment is subsequently left for employment, i.e.  = 	, the 
spell can only terminate if the individual returns to unemployment: ,) ≡ ,. 
We consider the following set of explanatory variables: the vector of exogenous time-constant observed 
and unobserved explanatory variables associated to each exit destination, denoted respectively by 0 
and 1 ≡ 23, , 3-, 3 , 3& , 3' , 3)4, and a strictly exogenous (or “external”) time-varying explanatory variable 
observed from the calendar time of entry in unemployment 5 until the end of the observation period 5, 
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 This table excludes individuals who were not labelled because they did not meet the search requirements in the job search-
monitoring scheme of the federal UI (Section 2.2).   
38
 Since we do not observe any transitions between entry in unemployment and 21 months, we shift the origin of the unemploy-
ment spell by 21 months: See Section 4.3. 
39
 The third stage only comes to an end if unemployment is left. 
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denoted by 6(5)7879
7:
.
40
 The time-constant observed variables retained for the analysis are the individ-
ual characteristics reported in Table 1 to which the square of age and the unemployment rate in the 
province of living at the start of the unemployment spell are added. The time-varying explanatory vari-
able is the provincial unemployment rate.  
Assumptions 
We assume that, for a given origin state and conditional on observed and unobserved explanatory 
variables, and on the duration and exit destination in the previous stages of unemployment, all latent 
unemployment durations are independent of each other within each stage:  
 A1.1: ∀ ≠ = ∈ 	, , :	)?  ⫫ )A	|6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, V 
 A1.2: ∀ ≠ = ∈ 	, , , :	? ⫫ A	|6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, V,  =  
 AC.3: ∀ ∈ ,  ∧  ≠ = ∈ 	, :	+?  ⫫ +A 	|6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, V,  = , " = + = "  
These assumptions together with the assumption of sequential exogeneity, which is equivalent to as-
suming “no anticipation”, and the assumption that all selection effects can be captured by the observed 
and unobserved explanatory variables, the joint conditional distribution  ≡ , " = + , ) =
+, , ,)|) > ̃, 6(5) = B(5)7879
7:
, X=x, V for  ∈ , 	can be expressed as the product of the following 
conditional distributions:2|) > ̃, 6(5) = B(5)7879
7:
, X=x, V4, 2" = +|) > ̃,  = , 6(5) =
B(5)7879
7:
, X=x, V4,	2) = +,|) > ̃, " = + = ",  = , 6(5) = B(5)7879
7:
, X=x, V4, and 2,)|	) =
+, = ) > ̃, " = + = ",  = , 6(5) = B(5)7879
7: , 0 = H, 1	4 for  ∈ , . Similar, but shorter, ex-
pressions are obtained in case of right censoring in unemployment, of exits from the labour force, no 
outsourcing, or no participation in any treatment. 
We further assume that the destination-specific unobserved explanatory variables capture all unob-
served determinants for all latent durations with a particular destination: 
 IJ.1: ∀ ∈ 	, , :	? ⫫ 1K?	|) > ̃, 6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, 3? 
 A2.2: ∀ ∈ 	, , , :	? ⫫ 1K?	|) > ̃̃ ̃̃,  = , 6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, 3? 
 IJ.3: ∀ ∈ ,  ∧  ∈ 	, :	+? ⫫ 1K? 	|) > ̃, = , " = + = ", 6(5) = B(5)78797: ,X=x, 3? 
 IJ. L: ∀ ∈ , :	,) ⫫ 1K? 	|) > ̃,	( = )M() > ̃ + ), (" = + = ")M() > ̃ +  +
																																																																																																																																																"), 6(5) = B(5)7879
7:
, X=x, 3? 
where 1K? ≡ (3, …3?K, 3?O, … , 3P), i.e. all the unobserved variables except for destination , and 
where M(. ) denotes the indicator function. 
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 The presence of these strictly exogenous time-varying explanatory variables facilitates identification. In a single-risk framework 
Brinch (2007) shows that then the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) assumption is no longer necessary for identification. 
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The aforementioned conditional distributions of the (latent) durations can be characterised by the cor-
responding conditional transition rates ℎ+?(R|̃, M( ≠ ), "M( ∈ , , 	), )M( = 	), B(5̃ + R +
	M( ∈ , ,  + M( ∈ , )) + )M( = 	)), H, S?) for T ∈ 1,2, , 	, where 5̃ = 5 + 21, T = 1	if  =
 and T = 2	if  ∈ , , and where the provincial unemployment rate B(5) is only contemporaneously 
related to the hazard rate. We assume that the lagged realised durations (, ", )) enter the specifica-
tion linearly, and that the hazard rates are of the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) form except for the 
terms capturing the treatment effects:  
IU. C:	Vℎ2W̃, B(5̃ +  + ), H, S4 = X() + ̃Y + B(5̃ +  + )Z + H[\ + S 
IU. J:	Vℎ?("|̃, , B(5̃ +  +  + "), H, SA) 	= X?(") + (̃ + )Y? + ]?
+ B(5̃+ +  + ")Z? 	+ H[\? + S? , ^	 ∈ , 	 
IU. U: V ℎ+?()|̃, , ", B(5̃ + )), H, S?) =X)?()) + B(5̃ + ))Z)? + H[\)? +
M() > 																																						̃ + )_)? + M() > ̃ +  + ")_)?+ + S? 				^  ∈ , , ,  ∧  ∈
	,  
 IU. L: V ℎ,)(,|), ̃, , ", =, B(5̃ + ) + ,), H, S))=X,)(,) + )Y,) + B(5̃ + ) + ,)Z,) +
																																																											H[\,) + M() > ̃ + )_,) + M() > ̃ +  + ")_,)A + S)		^ = ∈ ,   
where X+?(R) for T ∈ 1,2, , 	 is the logarithm of the baseline hazard, and where we impose for  ∈
, , ,  that X+?()) = X)?()), Z+? = Z)?, and +`? = `)?. _+?  measures the treatment effect of the PES 
() when the origin state is unemployment ( = ) or employment ( = 	) and the destination state is 
either employment or out of the labour force ( ∈ 	, ) if  = , or unemployment ( = ) if  = 	. _+?A 
is the corresponding treatment effect of FPO (= = ) or of NPO (= = ) in deviation from _+? . We allow 
also for a more general model in which the treatment effects depend on the linear index of a subset 
HC ⊂ H of the observed covariates (HC[ \+?), although not for the transition 	 (see Section 5):  
(A.1) _+? 2HC[ \+?4 = 2HC[ \+?4_+?b + _+? , 
(A.2) _+?A2HC[ \+?4 = 2HC[ \+?4_+?A +_+?RA , = ∈ ,  
for  ∈ 	, .  
Finally, we assume that the unobserved and observed covariates are independent 
 A4: 1 ⫫ 0, 
and that the baseline hazards and time-varying covariates are piecewise constant: 
 A5.1: X+?() = X+?R , cRdeK ≤  < cRde  
 If. J:	B25̃ + +̃	M( ∈ , , )+M( ∈ , ) + )M( = 	)4 = BRde , cRdeK ≤  < cRde  
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for  ∈ , , , 	, , 	, and where g0, cdei , … gcRdeK, cRdei , … gjdeK, ∞i define l+? duration in-
tervals and BRde  measures the median provincial unemployment rate in the interval, or between the start 
of the interval and the month of exit, if exit occurs before the end of the interval. Recall that by the 
aforementioned normalization zero in the first duration interval corresponds with an unemployment du-
ration of 21 months, since this is the shortest unemployment duration that we observe in the data. In 
addition, since by definition employment spells last minimum 3 months, zero for the employment dura-
tion intervals corresponds with 3 months, because employment durations can by definition never be 
less than 3 months.  
Identification 
Horny and Picchio (2010) show that under the aforementioned assumptions without time-varying ex-
planatory variables, but with sufficient variation in the continuous observed regressors and the auxiliary 
assumption that the first moment of the mixing distribution is finite, a competing risks model with lagged 
duration dependence is non-parametrically identified without any exclusion restrictions. Similar results 
are found more recently by Drepper and Effraimidis (2015). In view of the presence of a time-varying 
covariate (Brinch 2007) and the novel exclusion restrictions mentioned in Section 4.2, we therefore 
argue that identification does not crucially hinge on the MPH assumption.  
The aforementioned identification results of duration models are derived in a continuous time frame-
work. By contrast, in our data the information on (un)employment duration41 is grouped on a monthly 
basis. As shown in Ridder (1990), non-parametric identification with discrete duration data requires 
more structure on the systematic parts of the unemployment and employment hazards. The assumption 
that the linear index in the explanatory variables takes on every value in ℝ, is sufficient to identify the 
grouped baseline hazards from the observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Based on an extensive 
Monte Carlo analysis, Gaure, Røed, and Zhang (2007) report that, despite the time grouping of duration, 
the true structural parameters can still be robustly recovered from the observed data, to the extent that 
the discreteness of data measurement is explicitly taken into account when setting up the likelihood 
function. 
Likelihood Function 
We first derive the likelihood for a flow sample conditional on the unobserved explanatory variables 1. 
Recall, since the data are sampled at labelling when unemployment duration is at least 21 months, we 
shift the origin of the unemployment spell by 21 months (see Section 4.3). Subsequently, we integrate 
out the unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we follow the conditional likelihood approach proposed by 
Lancaster (1979), Nickell (1979) and Ridder (1984) to derive the likelihood for the left truncated obser-
vations at labelling, i.e. having an unemployment duration of strictly more than 21 months at labelling.  
Since the latent durations Tjd are assumed to be sequentially exogenous conditional on the observed 
and unobserved covariates the likelihood contribution for an individual entering the 21st month of unem-
ployment and observed with a sequence of completed durations (n+? = 1) is, by the chain rule, given by 
the product of densities of these latent durations, similar to the product that we obtained above for the 
joint conditional distribution of  ≡ , " = + , ) = +, , ,)|) > ̃, 6(5) = B(5)78797: , X=x, V for  ∈
, . If the observation is right censored at a particular duration (∑ n+?∀? = 0), then the last term in the 
product is the survivor function p+(. |. )	in the origin state . Making use of assumptions A5.1 and A5.2, 
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 By contrast, the starts of treatments are measured on a daily precision. 
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and ignoring for simplicity in the notation the dependence on explanatory variables and lagged dura-
tions, i.e. denoting this dependence by “.”, then the survivor function can be expressed as  
(A.3) p+(|.  = 	q g−M r ≥ di∑ ∑ ℎ+?cs|. csO − cs∀?RdeK"s8 − ℎ+? rcRdeKt. i r − cRdeKiu 
for cRdeK ≤  < cRde and  ∈ , , , 	, , 	.  
Since the density function of a latent duration Tjd is given by the product of the hazard function ℎ+?(.|.) 
and the survivor function p+. |. , the likelihood contribution of an individual sampled in the flow can thus 
be expressed as follows: 
(A.4) v&w, x|. ; z = {ℎ)|. |ℎ&"|. }~ℎ'"|. }~p"|. 79O97∗}~ p)|.  ∙	 
    gℎ),=) − ∆)|.   ℎ,)=, − ∆,|. } 	p,=, − ∆,|. ∆, u}∆∗ ∙ 
   ℎ)-=) − ∆)|. }p) . =) − ∆)|. ∆) 
where p)|.  is the survivor function of latent duration ) = , p) . =) − ∆)|.  ≡p),=) − ∆)|. . p)-=) − ∆)|. , =) (=,) denotes the upper bound of the month in which unemployment 
(employment) is left and ∆)∗= =1,=) − ̃, =) − ̃ − , =) − ̃ −  − " is the width of the interval 
in which unemployment is left,42 so that ) ∈ [=) − ∆)∗ , =) and , ∈ [=, − 1, =,; w = , ", =) , =,,x = 2n, n& , n', n), , n)- , n,)4, 5∗ is December 1, 2005, the date from which labelled individuals are for 
the first time at risk of being outsourced to an external provider, and z is the vector of unknown param-
eters.  
Making use of assumptions A.5.1-A.5.2, we can find a closed form solution for the integrals in (A.4): 
(A.5) v&w, x|. ; z = {ℎ)|. |ℎ&"|. }~ℎ'"|. }~p"|. 79O97∗}9~ p)|. 	.	 
  
 																												g2=) − ∆)∗ W.4|2=, − 1W.4K2=,W.42=, − 1W.4:u
2=) − ∆)∗ W.4
2=) − ∆)∗ W.4O2=) − ∆)∗ W.4 [p).=) − ∆)∗ |.  −
																																																																																																																				p).=)|. 
}O} ∙ p).=) − ∆)∗ |. K}O} 
The likelihood function in (A.5) is conditional on the unobserved explanatory variables 1. Given that the 
model is non-parametrically identified, we follow Heckman and Singer (1984) by integrating out the 
unobservables based on the assumption that the heterogeneity distribution is discrete with a finite and, 
a priori, unknown M number of points of support. On the basis of Monte Carlo simulations Gaure, Røed, 
and Zhang (2007) found that the number of points of support is most reliably chosen by minimizing the 
                                                     
42
 The width of a duration interval is equal to one month, except if the individual is labelled (=) − ̃ < 1), starts a treatment of 
the PES (=) − ̃ −  < 1) or an external provider (=) − ̃ −  − " < 1) in the month of exit. Notice, in contrast to the unem-
ployment and employment duration, we know the exact duration at which an individual is labelled or treated.    
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Akaike information criterion. We follow this recommendation. The probabilities that are associated with 
the points of support sum to 1 and, ∀= = 1,… , are denoted by 
(A.6) A = Pr	23, = S,A , 3- = S-A , 3 = SA , 3& = S&A , 3' = S'A , 3) = S)A4 ≡ ^1 = A 
and specified as logistic transforms: 
(A.7) A = ,b∑ ,b: , = = 1,…,   = 0 
Consequently, the likelihood contribution of an individual sampled in the flow is then 
(A.8) v&w, x|. ; z, ¡ = ∑ Av&w, x|. , 1 = A; z A8  
where ¢ = , … ,  . 
For an individual in the stock sample, i.e. for whom the unemployment duration exceeds 21 months at 
labelling, the conditional likelihood contribution is obtained by dividing the likelihood contribution of the 
flow sample by the probability of surviving ̃ ≡  − 21 > 0 months at labelling: 
(A.9) v£2w, xW̃,	. ; z, ¡4 = ∑ ¤2w, xW., 1 = A; z4:∑ : ¥9|.,18    
The log-likelihood function sums the logarithms of the likelihood contributions (A.5) and (A.9) of the 
individuals in the flow and in the stock samples.  
A.3 Simulation Method 
The simulation methodology is similar to the one proposed by Crépon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2005). 
The aims of the simulations are to obtain (i) goodness-of-fit of statistics of the estimated model and (ii) 
summary statistics of various counterfactual evaluations. For the goodness-of-fit we simulate the model 
for the complete sample that was used in the estimations, while for the counterfactual evaluations we 
do this for the various sub-samples that have undergone the treatment under consideration: the overall 
treatment, which always starts with the orientation phase or intake by the PES, or the treatment provided 
by a FPO or a NPO, which starts at the assignment to the external provider. For the counterfactual 
analysis we contrast the simulated outcomes obtained by setting the corresponding treatment indicator 
to one to those resulting when all treatment indicators are zero (when evaluating the overall treatment 
effect relative to the counterfactual of no treatment), or when an alternative treatment indicator is one 
(that of the PES or the NPO (FPO) in case of treatment by the FPO (NPO)). As such we obtain “treat-
ment effects on the treated”. Because the simulated durations may take on very large values, we report 
the median treatment effects on the treated (MTT) rather than the average treated effects on the treated 
(ATT). In addition, since a number of points of support of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
approach minus infinity, in the simulations some durations approach plus infinity. For cases in which 
we include these durations in the statistics (the unconditional distributions), we set these to the same 
very large value. Otherwise, they are ignored. 
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For each of the aforementioned objectives the simulation is repeated 999 times on the retained (sub-) 
sample. By calculating summary statistics (e.g., the median duration, or the fraction left to a particular 
destination over a fixed period of time) for each of these 999 simulations we can construct 95% CI 
intervals of these statistics by selecting the 5th and 95th percentiles of these 999 simulated statistics. 
These then can be compared to the corresponding statistic for the observed data in the case of the 
goodness-of-fit analysis, or to the median treatment effect in case of the counterfactual treatment anal-
ysis.  
The simulations proceed by the following steps:  
1. Draw a vector of parameters under the assumption that the true vector is jointly Normally dis-
tributed with the mean equal to the point estimates and variance to the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of these parameters. By doing so, the 95% CI takes the precision of the 
estimation into account. 
2. Based on this vector of parameters, randomly draw for each individual in the retained sample 
a six-dimensional vector of points of support from the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
at sample selection. Notice that this distribution is different for each of these (sub-)samples, 
since, as a consequence of the dynamic sorting process, it depends on the elapsed unemploy-
ment duration. This is even the case when we consider the complete sample, because of the 
presence of stock sampling. We will explain this further below. 
3. Based on this information calculate for each individual in the sample the value of the transition 
intensity to all destinations at each (un)employment duration.43 These values allow randomly 
drawing for each sampled individual a latent duration to any of the destinations at risk at that 
moment. Initially, at the moment of labelling, 3 latent durations are drawn: to employment (	), 
out of the labour force () or to treatment by the PES (). If treated by the PES, 4 latent durations 
are drawn: to employment (	), out of the labour force (), to treatment by an FPO () or by an 
NPO (). Finally, if treated by either an FPO or an NPO two latent durations are drawn: either 
to employment (	), out of the labour force (). A draw of a latent duration is obtained by ran-
domly drawing a value for the conditional probability of survival. The survival probability is con-
ditioned upon surviving at least +K months in the origin state  ∈ 0, , , , 	, because we at the 
start of each simulation the individual has always already been in that state for some period. 
Indeed, individuals are sampled at labelling, moment at which the individual has already been 
unemployed for at least 21 months. Moreover, since each different treatment state (PES, FPO 
or NPO) affects the transition intensities while participants are assumed to remain unemployed, 
each time an individual enters a treatment a new unemployment duration must be drawn con-
ditional on the elapsed unemployment duration at the start of this treatment. Since the condi-
tional survivor function is always bracketed by the zero-one interval, a random value is obtained 
by randomly drawing a number ^ 	from the uniform [0,1] distribution. The corresponding duration 
is then found by solving the equality of the conditional survivor function to ^ for the unknown 
latent duration +? for origin state  and destination state . To illustrate how this works, we 
ignore for notational simplicity the dependence of the transition intensities on the time-varying 
unemployment rate, the lagged dependent variables and the treatment indicators. In that case 
                                                     
43
 In the goodness-of-fit analysis of exits during the unemployment spell we take the effect of the time-varying unemployment 
rate into account, except for cases in which the simulated duration exceeds the realised one. In these cases we fix the unem-
ployment rate to the one observed at the end of the realised spell. For the goodness-of-fit of the cumulative exit rate from em-
ployment back to unemployment, we fix for simplicity the unemployment rate to the average in the corresponding duration inter-
vals. For the counterfactual analysis we fix the unemployment rate to its value at the start of the treatment both for in case of 
treatment and in the counterfactual of no treatment. 
 36 
the aforementioned equality takes the following form:  
^ = 	q ¦− exp2q[ +`? + S?4 ©exp rX+?sdei rsde − +?K i +ª exp2X+?«4 2« − «K4RdeK«8sdeO
+ exp rX+?Rdei r+? − RdeKi¬­ 
where +?K ∈ [2sdeK4, sde and +? ∈ [2RdeK4, Rde. By inverting this relation, one obtains: 
 
exp rX+?sdei rsde − +?K i + ª exp2X+?«4 2« − («K)4
RdeK
«8sdeO
+ exp rX+?Rdei r+? − (RdeK)i
= −log (^) exp2−q[ +`? − S?4 
This equation can be solved for +? by progressively increasing T+? from V+? to l+? until the 
equality is satisfied.  
4. Once latent durations for all possible destinations in the considered origin state have been 
drawn, the minimum of these latent durations defines the realised duration and destination 
state. The other latent durations are right censored. Subsequently, the destination state be-
comes origin state and we progress as described in point 3. Continue until an absorbing state 
is entered, i.e. out of the labour force or re-entry in unemployment after an employment spell. 
We do not right censor observations at the end of the observation period. This requires assum-
ing that the baseline hazard remains constant in the last duration interval and that the provincial 
unemployment rate remains fixed at the last known value for the considered individual (see 
footnote 38). In this way the issue of right censoring is avoided when producing summary sta-
tistics of the simulated duration distributions. Nevertheless, one still need to take into account 
that the duration is infinite for those individuals for whom a point of support of the unobserved 
heterogeneity distribution has been drawn that tends to minus infinity.  
5. Based on the simulated durations the summary statistics of interest can be calculated for the 
retained sample.  
6. Go back to the first step until 999 simulations have been performed. 
7. Based on the 999 summary statistics one can easily calculate the median of these statistics 
and construct empirical 95% CI’s. 
In point 2 we mentioned that the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity depends on the elapsed 
duration in the origin state of interest at sample selection. For instance, consider the sample selected 
at labelling, i.e. when the elapsed unemployment duration is  ≥ 21. The estimated distribution of un-
observed heterogeneity applies to an individual who has been 21 months unemployed, since exits be-
fore these 21 months are not observed in the data. The unobserved heterogeneity distribution for an 
individual for whom the elapsed unemployment duration strictly exceeds 21 months at labelling differs, 
because it is affected by dynamic sorting, i.e. individuals with a low (unobserved) likelihood of leaving 
unemployment are more likely to remain unemployed for more than 21 months. Hence, the distribution 
of unobserved heterogeneity for an individual with an elapsed duration equal to  > 21 is characterised 
by the following probabilities ±A for = = 1, … ,  = 11: 
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±A = 9K"|.,18)∑ : (9K"|.,18) . 
Hence, we first calculate these modified probabilities before assigning unobserved mass points to indi-
viduals. In case of the counterfactual evaluations we similarly modify these probabilities to take the 
elapsed duration at the start of the considered treatment into account. 
A.4 Complete Estimation Results  
Table A. 2: The Complete Estimation Results 
Proportional Effect of Hazard Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) 
A. Transition from U to E    
Treatment PES (ref.) 0.809*** (0.041) 1.717*** (0.068) 1.639*** (0.077) 
Treatment FPO 0.410*** (0.065) 0.228* (0.116) 0.294*** (0.105) 
Treatment NPO 0.311*** (0.082) 0.028 (0.119) 0.187 (0.127) 
Treatment PES * Linear index   -0.458*** (0.074) 
Treatment FPO * Linear index   -0.222* (0.125) 
Treatment NPO * Linear index   -0.314* (0.171) 
District: Mechelen -0.269*** (0.082) -0.106 (0.103) -0.040 (0.099) 
District: Turnhout -0.085 (0.082) -0.124 (0.095) -0.159* (0.097) 
District: Leuven 0.480*** (0.161) 0.354*** (0.130) 0.400*** (0.136) 
District: Vilvoorde 0.614*** (0.156) 0.393*** (0.131) 0.441*** (0.137) 
District: Brugge 0.428** (0.173) 0.135 (0.164) 0.213 (0.161) 
District: Kortrijk-Roeselare 0.315** (0.148) 0.248* (0.132) 0.288** (0.135) 
District: Oostende-Ieper 0.453*** (0.150) 0.410*** (0.132) 0.421*** (0.136) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde -0.045 (0.114) 0.090 (0.116) 0.102 (0.117) 
District: Gent 0.232*** (0.084) 0.141* (0.080) 0.159** (0.078) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 0.235** (0.106) 0.292** (0.112) 0.307*** (0.118) 
District: Hasselt 0.045 (0.062) -0.183** (0.076) -0.182** (0.075) 
District: Tongeren -0.101 (0.103) -0.559*** (0.128) -0.554*** (0.130) 
Woman -0.124*** (0.036) -0.155*** (0.043) -0.260*** (0.060) 
Migrant background -0.169*** (0.053) -0.287*** (0.062) -0.537*** (0.098) 
Disabled -0.814*** (0.052) -0.342*** (0.074) -0.757*** (0.151) 
Driver's licence 0.202*** (0.041) 0.053 (0.047) 0.087 (0.069) 
Proficient in Dutch -0.124** (0.055) 0.040 (0.064) 0.069 (0.089) 
Number of languages in which proficient 0.039* (0.022) 0.038 (0.026) 0.051 (0.035) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  0.018 (0.046) -0.006 (0.052) 0.026 (0.077) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  -0.189*** (0.050) 0.113** (0.056) 0.223*** (0.081) 
Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) -0.338*** (0.071) -0.055 (0.084) 0.086 (0.114) 
Age at labelling -0.044 (0.037) -0.119*** (0.039) -0.093* (0.054) 
(Age at labelling)² 0.000 (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
X),": [c = 3, c" = 6) -0.104 (0.111) 0.240* (0.144) 0.378*** (0.143) 
X),´: [c" = 6, c´ = 9) -0.250** (0.113) 0.329* (0.175) 0.510*** (0.171) 
X),¶: [c´ = 9, c¶ = 12) -0.375*** (0.116) 0.281 (0.175) 0.473*** (0.173) 
X),·: [c¶ = 12, c· = 15) -0.539*** (0.116) 0.206 (0.172) 0.427** (0.173) 
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X),¹: [c· = 15, c¹ = 22) -0.586*** (0.107) 0.158 (0.162) 0.386** (0.165) X),º: [c¹ = 22, cº = 34) -0.891*** (0.107) -0.032 (0.162) 0.238 (0.164) X),¼: [cº = 34, c¼ = 46) -1.117*** (0.115) -0.066 (0.167) 0.240 (0.168) X),½: [c¼ = 46, c½ = 76) -1.830*** (0.113) -0.218 (0.170) 0.117 (0.171) X),: [c½ = 76, c =∞) -2.251*** (0.120) -0.148 (0.176) 0.133 (0.173) 
Intercept -3.956*** (0.127) -5.008*** (0.218) -5.128*** (0.219) 
B. Transition from U to OLF    
Treatment PES (ref.) 0.336*** (0.038) 1.678*** (0.067) 2.281*** (0.108) 
Treatment FPO -0.058 (0.082) 0.314** (0.130) 0.245* (0.131) 
Treatment NPO -0.083 (0.096) 0.157 (0.138) 0.187 (0.155) 
Treatment PES * Linear index - - -0.633*** (0.046) 
Treatment FPO * Linear index - - -0.078 (0.118) 
Treatment NPO * Linear index - - -0.132 (0.143) 
District: Mechelen -0.159* (0.083) 0.076 (0.123) 0.162 (0.110) 
District: Turnhout 0.143* (0.075) 0.186* (0.108) 0.227** (0.103) 
District: Leuven 1.349*** (0.138) 0.813*** (0.141) 0.972*** (0.139) 
District: Vilvoorde 1.247*** (0.140) 0.865*** (0.150) 1.075*** (0.140) 
District: Brugge 0.943*** (0.163) 0.671*** (0.183) 0.822*** (0.173) 
District: Kortrijk-Roeselare 1.127*** (0.131) 0.835*** (0.141) 0.954*** (0.135) 
District: Oostende-Ieper 1.012*** (0.138) 0.892*** (0.151) 1.073*** (0.141) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde 0.525*** (0.104) 0.685*** (0.123) 0.781*** (0.116) 
District: Gent 0.590*** (0.078) 0.402*** (0.092) 0.535*** (0.087) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 0.396*** (0.106) 0.320** (0.136) 0.463*** (0.122) 
District: Hasselt 0.188*** (0.059) 0.047 (0.089) 0.096 (0.086) 
District: Tongeren 0.185** (0.093) -0.172 (0.140) -0.038 (0.133) 
Woman 0.254*** (0.036) 0.294*** (0.049) 0.160** (0.072) 
Migrant background 0.302*** (0.049) 0.292*** (0.067) 0.365*** (0.093) 
Disabled -0.120*** (0.041) 0.710*** (0.077) 1.381*** (0.123) 
Driver's licence 0.057 (0.038) -0.127** (0.054) -0.296*** (0.069) 
Proficient in Dutch 0.048 (0.051) 0.224*** (0.076) 0.117 (0.095) 
Number of languages in which proficient -0.058** (0.023) -0.073** (0.033) -0.043 (0.046) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  -0.013 (0.043) -0.117** (0.059) -0.132* (0.077) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  -0.224*** (0.049) 0.083 (0.066) 0.112 (0.087) 
Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) -0.417*** (0.076) -0.103 (0.110) 0.057 (0.159) 
Age at labelling -0.009 (0.034) -0.137*** (0.046) -0.262*** (0.063) 
(Age at labelling)² 0.000 (0.000) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 0.000 (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.004*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 
X)-": [c = 3, c" = 6) 0.396*** (0.114) 0.290** (0.143) 0.146 (0.124) X)-´: [c" = 6, c´ = 9) 0.024 (0.120) -0.059 (0.183) -0.235* (0.139) X)-¶: [c´ = 9, c¶ = 12) 0.083 (0.119) 0.054 (0.201) -0.141 (0.141) X)-·: [c¶ = 12, c· = 15) -0.353*** (0.126) -0.302 (0.222) -0.504*** (0.151) X)-¹: [c· = 15, c¹ = 22) -0.240** (0.113) -0.153 (0.222) -0.352** (0.137) X)-º: [c¹ = 22, cº = 34) -0.383*** (0.111) -0.152 (0.236) -0.330** (0.136) X)-¼: [cº = 34, c¼ = 46) -0.430*** (0.118) -0.019 (0.247) -0.172 (0.143) X)-½: [c¼ = 46, c½ = 76) -0.962*** (0.115) -0.058 (0.247) -0.200 (0.147) X)-: [c½ = 76, c =∞) -1.248*** (0.116) 0.268 (0.252) 0.092 (0.150) 
Intercept -4.696*** (0.130) -6.162*** (0.247) -6.238*** (0.202) 
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C. Transition from U to PES    
t0: unemployment duration at labelling  0.001** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) 
District: Mechelen 0.475*** (0.049) 0.940*** (0.067) 0.898*** (0.064) 
District: Turnhout 0.266*** (0.042) 0.656*** (0.054) 0.643*** (0.053) 
District: Leuven 1.650*** (0.083) 1.132*** (0.086) 1.101*** (0.084) 
District: Vilvoorde 1.855*** (0.082) 1.380*** (0.084) 1.328*** (0.082) 
District: Brugge 1.723*** (0.083) 1.257*** (0.094) 1.224*** (0.093) 
District: Kortrijk-Roeselare 1.977*** (0.076) 1.727*** (0.085) 1.687*** (0.084) 
District: Oostende-Ieper 1.970*** (0.079) 1.799*** (0.085) 1.753*** (0.085) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde 1.490*** (0.060) 1.505*** (0.069) 1.482*** (0.068) 
District: Gent 1.083*** (0.047) 0.739*** (0.049) 0.716*** (0.048) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 1.302*** (0.064) 1.347*** (0.067) 1.313*** (0.066) 
District: Hasselt 0.141*** (0.038) 0.683*** (0.046) 0.669*** (0.046) 
District: Tongeren 0.333*** (0.051) 0.546*** (0.078) 0.503*** (0.073) 
Woman -0.098*** (0.021) -0.046* (0.025) -0.036 (0.025) 
Migrant background 0.176*** (0.032) 0.020 (0.038) 0.033 (0.037) 
Disabled 0.192*** (0.022) -0.159*** (0.029) -0.166*** (0.029) 
Driver's licence -0.056** (0.022) -0.003 (0.027) -0.001 (0.027) 
Proficient in Dutch -0.037 (0.030) 0.092** (0.037) 0.103*** (0.036) 
Number of languages in which proficient 0.011 (0.013) -0.049*** (0.016) -0.049*** (0.016) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  0.051** (0.025) 0.064** (0.031) 0.062** (0.031) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  0.003 (0.028) 0.002 (0.034) 0.006 (0.034) 
Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) 0.007 (0.042) -0.008 (0.051) -0.024 (0.049) 
Age at labelling -0.052** (0.021) -0.118*** (0.025) -0.107*** (0.025) 
(Age at labelling)² 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.006*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
X)": [c~ = 1, c"~ = 2) 0.584*** (0.045) 0.679*** (0.046) 0.674*** (0.046) 
X)´: [c"~ = 2, c´~ = 3) 0.672*** (0.047) 0.807*** (0.049) 0.797*** (0.048) 
X)¶: [c´~ = 3, c¶~ = 4) 0.718*** (0.047) 0.995*** (0.051) 0.979*** (0.050) 
X)·: [c¶~ = 4, c·~ = 6) 0.361*** (0.044) 0.874*** (0.051) 0.853*** (0.049) 
X)¹: [c·~ = 6, c¹~ = 8) 0.017 (0.049) 0.840*** (0.057) 0.812*** (0.054) 
X)º: [c¹~ = 8, cº~ = 10) 0.755*** (0.045) 1.577*** (0.059) 1.547*** (0.056) 
X)¼: [cº~ = 10, c¼~ = 12) 1.239*** (0.049) 2.155*** (0.067) 2.123*** (0.063) 
X)½: [c¼~ = 12, c½~ = 15) 1.192*** (0.047) 2.564*** (0.074) 2.522*** (0.069) 
X): [c½~ = 15, c~ =∞) 0.234*** (0.067) 3.750*** (0.098) 3.675*** (0.092) 
Intercept -3.858*** (0.059) -2.996*** (0.114) -3.030*** (0.083) 
D. Transition from PES to FPO    
t0: unemployment duration at labelling -0.001* (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
t1:duration between labelling and orientation phase -0.061*** (0.008) -0.042** (0.017) -0.047*** (0.015) 
District: Mechelen -0.580*** (0.148) -0.485*** (0.180) -0.519*** (0.172) 
District: Turnhout -0.621*** (0.161) -0.536*** (0.177) -0.565*** (0.173) 
District: Leuven 0.514*** (0.183) 0.552** (0.240) 0.526** (0.230) 
District: Vilvoorde -0.401* (0.211) -0.480* (0.252) -0.502** (0.245) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde -0.554*** (0.182) -0.479** (0.214) -0.525** (0.206) 
District: Gent 0.234** (0.100) 0.277** (0.130) 0.247** (0.123) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw -0.720*** (0.194) -0.671*** (0.221) -0.709*** (0.214) 
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District: Hasselt -0.245** (0.114) -0.041 (0.152) -0.089 (0.142) 
District: Tongeren -0.900*** (0.210) -0.850*** (0.225) -0.883*** (0.218) 
Woman -0.109* (0.061) -0.165** (0.070) -0.129* (0.068) 
Migrant background -0.227** (0.100) -0.304*** (0.109) -0.275*** (0.105) 
Disabled -1.937*** (0.115) -2.142*** (0.131) -2.106*** (0.128) 
Driver's licence 0.154** (0.068) 0.183** (0.078) 0.184** (0.076) 
Proficient in Dutch 0.424*** (0.103) 0.436*** (0.110) 0.449*** (0.107) 
Number of languages in which proficient 0.112*** (0.035) 0.130*** (0.041) 0.122*** (0.039) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  0.062 (0.079) 0.142 (0.092) 0.116 (0.088) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  -0.113 (0.080) -0.094 (0.093) -0.101 (0.090) 
Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) -0.175 (0.107) -0.166 (0.127) -0.189 (0.121) 
Age at labelling 0.009 (0.073) -0.067 (0.085) -0.033 (0.080) 
(Age at labelling)² 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
X&": [c~ = 0.45, c"~ = 0.55) 1.907*** (0.119) 1.942*** (0.120) 1.933*** (0.120) 
X&´: [c"~ = 0.55, c´~ = 0.7) 1.171*** (0.130) 1.245*** (0.132) 1.225*** (0.131) 
X&¶: [c´~ = 0.7, c¶~ = 0.8) 1.916*** (0.121) 2.025*** (0.125) 1.997*** (0.124) 
X&·: [c¶~ = 0.8, c·~ = 1) 1.066*** (0.127) 1.218*** (0.134) 1.178*** (0.133) 
X&¹: [c·~ = 1, c¹~ = 1.25) 0.795*** (0.132) 0.986*** (0.142) 0.935*** (0.140) 
X&º: [c¹~ = 1.25, cº~ = 1.75) 0.257** (0.129) 0.500*** (0.146) 0.434*** (0.142) 
X&¼: [cº~ = 1.75, c¼~ = 2.5) -0.279** (0.137) 0.011 (0.161) -0.069 (0.155) 
X&½: [c¼~ = 2.5, c½~ = 4) -0.980*** (0.141) -0.649*** (0.173) -0.743*** (0.165) 
X&: [c½~ = 4, c~ =∞) -3.019*** (0.154) -2.645*** (0.194) -2.751*** (0.183) 
Intercept -2.772*** (0.174) -2.282*** (0.225) -2.428*** (0.217) 
E. Transition from PES to NPO    
t0: unemployment duration at labelling 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
t1:duration between labelling and orientation phase -0.055*** (0.011) -0.054*** (0.020) -0.055*** (0.020) 
District: Mechelen 1.559*** (0.162) 1.532*** (0.198) 1.530*** (0.194) 
District: Turnhout 1.348*** (0.171) 1.374*** (0.190) 1.360*** (0.187) 
District: Leuven -0.697 (0.470) -0.777 (0.483) -0.765 (0.480) 
District: Vilvoorde -0.118 (0.335) -0.278 (0.358) -0.267 (0.354) 
District: Brugge 1.740*** (0.274) 1.762*** (0.317) 1.718*** (0.301) 
District: Kortrijk-Roeselare 1.966*** (0.222) 1.936*** (0.263) 1.931*** (0.259) 
District: Oostende-Ieper 1.811*** (0.219) 1.725*** (0.264) 1.723*** (0.260) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde 1.205*** (0.209) 1.138*** (0.239) 1.128*** (0.235) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 0.989*** (0.215) 0.923*** (0.246) 0.917*** (0.241) 
District: Hasselt 1.560*** (0.149) 1.707*** (0.187) 1.679*** (0.182) 
District: Tongeren 0.945*** (0.207) 0.917*** (0.236) 0.910*** (0.231) 
Woman -0.187** (0.074) -0.231*** (0.082) -0.198** (0.080) 
Migrant background -0.469*** (0.147) -0.495*** (0.153) -0.486*** (0.150) 
Disabled -1.759*** (0.108) -1.971*** (0.125) -1.942*** (0.124) 
Driver's licence 0.006 (0.082) 0.047 (0.092) 0.042 (0.090) 
Proficient in Dutch 0.281** (0.118) 0.305** (0.125) 0.314** (0.122) 
Number of languages in which proficient -0.052 (0.049) -0.054 (0.053) -0.059 (0.051) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  0.168* (0.090) 0.222** (0.100) 0.207** (0.097) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  0.071 (0.100) 0.054 (0.111) 0.052 (0.109) 
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Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) 0.081 (0.149) 0.064 (0.163) 0.064 (0.160) 
Age at labelling 0.258*** (0.093) 0.237** (0.110) 0.255** (0.107) 
(Age at labelling)² -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
X'": [c~ = 0.45, c"~ = 0.55) 2.189*** (0.151) 2.224*** (0.152) 2.216*** (0.152) 
X'´: [c"~ = 0.55, c´~ = 0.7) 1.388*** (0.165) 1.460*** (0.167) 1.443*** (0.167) 
X'¶: [c´~ = 0.7, c¶~ = 0.8) 2.090*** (0.157) 2.201*** (0.161) 2.175*** (0.160) 
X'·: [c¶~ = 0.8, c·~ = 1) 1.498*** (0.157) 1.660*** (0.163) 1.622*** (0.162) 
X'¹: [c·~ = 1, c¹~ = 1.25) 1.275*** (0.159) 1.481*** (0.169) 1.432*** (0.168) 
X'º: [c¹~ = 1.25, cº~ = 1.75) 0.700*** (0.158) 0.952*** (0.173) 0.890*** (0.171) 
X'¼: [cº~ = 1.75, c¼~ = 2.5) -0.105 (0.177) 0.189 (0.195) 0.114 (0.193) 
X'½: [c¼~ = 2.5, c½~ = 4) -1.102*** (0.197) -0.779*** (0.219) -0.864*** (0.215) 
X': [c½~ = 4, c~ =∞) -2.949*** (0.202) -2.586*** (0.229) -2.685*** (0.224) 
Intercept -4.203*** (0.224) -3.737*** (0.284) -3.860*** (0.269) 
F. Transition from E to U    
Treatment PES (ref.) 0.180*** (0.039) 0.243*** (0.078) 0.240*** (0.071) 
Treatment FPO 0.023 (0.059) -0.043 (0.111) -0.073 (0.083) 
Treatment NPO 0.128 (0.084) 0.061 (0.119) 0.037 (0.093) 
Unemployment duration prior to job transition 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
District: Mechelen -0.139* (0.082) -0.148* (0.084) -0.153* (0.085) 
District: Turnhout -0.034 (0.085) -0.037 (0.083) -0.044 (0.083) 
District: Leuven 0.304** (0.119) 0.313*** (0.120) 0.310** (0.120) 
District: Vilvoorde 0.075 (0.113) 0.080 (0.118) 0.068 (0.119) 
District: Brugge 0.342** (0.144) 0.356** (0.147) 0.348** (0.148) 
District: Kortrijk-Roeselare 0.047 (0.115) 0.047 (0.121) 0.039 (0.121) 
District: Oostende-Ieper 0.151 (0.128) 0.155 (0.120) 0.146 (0.121) 
District: Aalst-Oudenaarde 0.012 (0.101) 0.005 (0.103) -0.006 (0.104) 
District: Gent 0.091 (0.067) 0.095 (0.068) 0.090 (0.067) 
District: St-Niklaas-Denderleeuw 0.123 (0.091) 0.128 (0.096) 0.122 (0.093) 
District: Hasselt 0.003 (0.060) -0.004 (0.063) -0.007 (0.063) 
District: Tongeren -0.056 (0.093) -0.069 (0.102) -0.076 (0.103) 
Woman -0.003 (0.035) -0.006 (0.036) -0.001 (0.036) 
Migrant background 0.047 (0.051) 0.037 (0.055) 0.036 (0.053) 
Disabled 0.033 (0.048) 0.008 (0.059) -0.015 (0.060) 
Driver's licence -0.008 (0.038) -0.002 (0.040) 0.004 (0.041) 
Proficient in Dutch -0.065 (0.053) -0.069 (0.056) -0.067 (0.054) 
Number of languages in which proficient 0.019 (0.022) 0.020 (0.022) 0.021 (0.022) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 10 & < grade 12)  -0.083* (0.044) -0.082* (0.045) -0.083* (0.045) 
Education: secondary (≥ grade 12)  -0.080* (0.049) -0.084* (0.050) -0.087* (0.050) 
Education: tertiary (bachelor or master) -0.120* (0.069) -0.122* (0.069) -0.126* (0.070) 
Age at labelling -0.029 (0.035) -0.030 (0.036) -0.027 (0.035) 
(Age at labelling)² 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate at labelling 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Provincial unemployment rate during interval 0.083*** (0.020) 0.084*** (0.020) 0.083*** (0.020) 
X,)": [c = 4, c" = 5) 0.329*** (0.086) 0.330*** (0.086) 0.330*** (0.086) X,)´: [c" = 5, c´ = 6) 0.278*** (0.089) 0.280*** (0.089) 0.281*** (0.089) 
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X,)¶: [c´ = 6, c¶ = 7) 0.325*** (0.090) 0.327*** (0.090) 0.329*** (0.090) X,)·: [c¶ = 7, c· = 9) 0.042 (0.085) 0.045 (0.085) 0.048 (0.085) X,)¹: [c· = 9, c¹ = 12) -0.119 (0.084) -0.114 (0.084) -0.110 (0.084) X,)º: [c¹ = 12, cº = 13) 1.115*** (0.086) 1.121*** (0.086) 1.126*** (0.086) X,)¼: [cº = 13, c¼ = 18) -0.142* (0.086) -0.133 (0.086) -0.126 (0.086) X,)½: [c¼ = 18, c½ = 24) -0.176** (0.089) -0.165* (0.090) -0.156* (0.090) X,): [c½ = 24, c = 36) -0.165** (0.083) -0.147* (0.087) -0.135 (0.087) X,): [c = 36, c =∞) -0.089 (0.085) -0.063 (0.103) -0.042 (0.100) 
Intercept -3.397*** (0.198) -3.408*** (0.243) -3.376*** (0.228) 
G. Unobserved heterogeneity distribution: mass points 
S," - 3.550*** (0.378) 3.951*** (0.279) 
S-" - 3.366*** (0.495) 3.278*** (0.544) S" - -∞ -∞ 
S&" - 0 0 
S'" - 0 0 
S)" - 0.000 (0.173) -0.059 (0.153) 
S,´  - -∞ -∞ 
S-´  - -∞ -∞ S´  - -0.037 (0.108) -0.020 (0.078) 
S&´  - -0.067 (0.157) 0.003 (0.159) 
S'´  - 0.015 (0.194) 0.052 (0.175) 
S)´  - 0 0 
S,¶ - -0.176 (0.193) -0.895*** (0.227) 
S-¶ - 1.053*** (0.152) 1.090*** (0.145) S¶ - -7.733*** (0.461) -7.967*** (0.554) 
S&¶ - -∞ -∞ 
S'¶ - -∞ -∞ 
S)¶ - 0.104 (0.162) 0.048 (0.174) 
S,· - 0.149 (0.239) 0.256 (0.199) 
S-· - 1.149*** (0.270) 1.231*** (0.171) S· - -0.254 (0.215) -0.384*** (0.140) 
S&· - -∞ -∞ 
S'· - -∞ -∞ 
S)· - -0.162 (0.372) -0.316 (0.210) 
S,¹ - 0.758*** (0.165) 0.625*** (0.132) 
S-¹ - 0.604* (0.326) 0.448* (0.233) S¹ - -1.306*** (0.178) -1.358*** (0.141) 
S&¹ - -0.511 (0.533) -0.232 (0.419) 
S'¹ - 0.017 (0.764) 0.051 (0.607) 
S)¹ - 0.072 (0.167) 0.085 (0.134) 
S,º - -∞ -∞ 
S-º - -3.479*** (0.634) -3.364*** (0.638) Sº - -1.584*** (0.192) -1.525*** (0.175) 
S&º - -1.386** (0.583) -1.108** (0.555) 
S'º - -0.231 (0.486) -0.036 (0.452) 
S)º - 0 0 
S,¼ - 0.588 (0.804) -0.804 (0.942) 
S-¼ - 3.301*** (0.221) 3.620*** (0.176) 
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S¼ - -∞ -∞ 
S&¼ - 0 0 
S'¼ - 0 0 
S)¼ - 0.004 (0.497) -0.237 (0.601) 
S,½ - -∞ -∞ 
S-½ - -∞ -∞ S½ - -8.314*** (0.607) -7.966*** (0.568) 
S&½ - -∞ -∞ 
S'½ - -∞ -∞ 
S)½ - 0 0 
S, - 0.549 (0.871) 2.295*** (0.316) 
S- - 2.307*** (0.431) -0.646 (0.863) S - -1.377 (0.972) -5.758*** (0.893) 
S& - -∞ -∞ 
S' - -∞ -∞ 
S) - -0.384 (1.249) 0.109 (0.225) 
S, - -∞ -∞ 
S- - -3.269*** (0.318) -3.223*** (0.401) S - -0.300* (0.158) -0.254* (0.134) 
S& - -∞ -∞ 
S' - -∞ -∞ 
S) - 0 0 
G. Unobserved heterogeneity distribution: proportions 
" - -0.174 (0.272) -0.510** (0.205) 
´ - -0.430*** (0.153) -0.546*** (0.133) 
¶ - -0.405** (0.192) -0.707*** (0.151) 
· - -0.196 (0.387) -0.380 (0.285) 
¹ - -0.694** (0.352) -1.131*** (0.356) 
º - -2.167*** (0.291) -2.410*** (0.283) 
¼ - -0.202 (0.293) -0.099 (0.163) 
½ - -1.157*** (0.166) -1.437*** (0.138) 
 - -1.143** (0.470) -1.840*** (0.311) 
 - -0.938*** (0.291) -1.254*** (0.326) 
p - 0.184 0.230 
p" - 0.155 0.138 
p´ - 0.120 0.133 
p¶ - 0.123 0.113 
p· - 0.151 0.157 
p¹ - 0.092 0.074 
pº - 0.021 0.021 
p¼ - 0.150 0.208 
p½ - 0.058 0.055 
p - 0.059 0.036 
p - 0.072 0.065 
Log-likelihood -99,183.716 -98,081.915 -97,984.08 
Akaike Information Criterion 198,811.432 195,579.830 196,564.160 
Parameters 222 292 298 
N 16,186 16,186 16,186 
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A.5 Goodness-of-Fit 
Table A. 3: The Cumulative Fraction Leaving Unemployment 
 
Exit to employment Exit from labour force Exit from unemployment 
Month Observed 5% 95% Observed 5% 95% Observed 5% 95% 
1 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.025 
2 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.042 0.041 0.048 
3 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.042 0.064 0.062 0.07 
6 0.061 0.056 0.067 0.072 0.075 0.086 0.128 0.13 0.144 
9 0.095 0.09 0.103 0.109 0.104 0.117 0.194 0.188 0.203 
12 0.128 0.122 0.138 0.141 0.133 0.148 0.251 0.242 0.261 
18 0.179 0.176 0.195 0.188 0.173 0.191 0.333 0.324 0.344 
24 0.216 0.211 0.232 0.22 0.202 0.222 0.389 0.376 0.396 
36 0.253 0.244 0.266 0.257 0.238 0.259 0.445 0.43 0.451 
48 0.264 0.26 0.282 0.276 0.261 0.283 0.467 0.459 0.48 
60 0.268 0.268 0.29 0.285 0.276 0.299 0.477 0.476 0.497 
72 0.271 0.273 0.296 0.291 0.288 0.311 0.483 0.488 0.509 
Notes. “Month” = months elapsed since labelling; “observed” = fraction in sample leaving unemployment to mentioned destination 
(in the presence of a competing risk, exit to the other destination is treated as right censored). Fractions in bold are comprised 
by the 95% CI; “5%” = the lower bound of the 95% CI; “95%” = the upper bound of the 95% CI. The 95% CI’s are determined by 
simulation as described in Appendix A.3. 
Table A. 4: The Cumulative Fraction Entering Treatment  
 
Treatment by the PES Treatment by FPO Treatment by NPO 
Month Observed 5% 95% Observed 5% 95% Observed 5% 95% 
1 0.048 0.045 0.053 0.066 0.064 0.079 0.046 0.039 0.049 
2 0.127 0.124 0.135 0.092 0.088 0.108 0.068 0.058 0.074 
3 0.197 0.194 0.209 0.103 0.096 0.117 0.075 0.062 0.079 
6 0.368 0.362 0.38 0.114 0.102 0.125 0.081 0.065 0.083 
9 0.497 0.492 0.51 0.116 0.104 0.127 0.082 0.066 0.084 
12 0.626 0.626 0.645 0.116 0.105 0.129 0.082 0.067 0.085 
18 0.773 0.757 0.775 0.116 0.107 0.131 0.082 0.067 0.086 
24 0.778 0.769 0.787 - - - - - - 
Notes. “Month” = months elapsed since labelling if treatment by the PES and since the start of the orientation phase/intake 
otherwise; “observed” = fraction in sample treated by mentioned provider (in the presence of a competing risk, exit to the other 
destination is treated as right censored). Fractions in bold are comprised by the 95% CI; “5%” = the lower bound of the 95% CI; 
“95%” = the upper bound of the 95% CI. The 95% CI’s are determined by simulation as described in Appendix A.3. 
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Table A. 5: The Cumulative Fraction of Employed Returning to Unemployment 
 
Exit to unemployment 
Month Observed 5% 95% 
4 0.068 0.045 0.064 
5 0.154 0.13 0.159 
6 0.229 0.205 0.238 
9 0.392 0.369 0.409 
12 0.492 0.471 0.511 
18 0.685 0.668 0.705 
24 0.771 0.755 0.788 
36 0.882 0.866 0.894 
48 0.941 0.93 0.95 
60 0.975 0.961 0.976 
72 0.986 0.978 0.989 
Notes. “Month” = months elapsed since entry in employment (by definition employment always lasts at least 3 months); “observed” 
= fraction in sample leaving employment to unemployment. Fractions in bold are comprised by the 95% CI; “5%” = the lower 
bound of the 95% CI; “95%” = the upper bound of the 95% CI. The 95% CI’s are determined by simulation as described in 
Appendix A.3. 
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